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Abstract
Philosophers from Leibniz to Parfit have tackled the problem of existence and the problem of
arbitrarity. I divide the solutions to these two problems into three general categories: (1) infinite
regress answers, (2) ex nihilo answers, and (3) self-caused cause answers. I show that the first
two (infinite regress and ex nihilo) categories of answers either fail to answer the problem of
existence or the problem of arbitrarity or fail to satisfy one or more reasonable assumptions
about said problems. Believing it to be useful to a self-caused cause answer to the problem of
existence and the problem of arbitrarily, I explicate Baruch de Spinoza’s metaphysics. Finally, I
construct a self-caused cause answer to the problem of existence and the problem of arbitrarity
using Spinozistic metaphysics.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

To my mind, there are two great questions in philosophy which stand out amongst the
rest: (1) the problem of existence (Po∃), i.e., “Why is there something instead of nothing?”; and
(2) the problem of arbitrarity (PoA), i.e., “Why does something exist as it does rather than some
other way?”. 1 Both of these questions concern existence, the first concerns the ultimate origin of
existence in general, whereas the second concerns the nature of the ultimate origin of existence
in particular. My quest herein is to answer these two great philosophical questions, and in so
doing lay the foundation of a grand unified metaphysics.
It is essential to understand from the outset that I am herein concerned exclusively with
the etiology of existence. With that in mind, note that there are only three (epistemically)
possible answers to the Po∃.
•

Infinite Regression

•

Ex Nihilo

•

Self-caused Cause
But before we get into the (epistemically) possible answers, it’s important to list the

assumptions I make about the Po∃ and the PoA and how those assumptions affect what counts as
an acceptable answer to the Po∃ and the PoA.

1

Leibniz appears to have been of a similar mind about the important of these two questions. (See, Lloyd Strickland,
Leibniz’s Monadology – A New Translation and Guide, pg. 274, Edinburgh, Scotland, Edinburgh University Press,
2014). The relevant passage is as follows: “Until now we have spoken only as physicists; now we must rise to
metaphysics, by making use of the great principle, not commonly used, which holds that nothing takes place
without sufficient reason, that is, that nothing happens without it being possible for one who has enough knowledge
of things to give a reason which is sufficient to determine why it is thus and not otherwise. With this principle in
place, the first question we are entitled to ask will be: why is there something rather than nothing? For nothing is
simpler and easier than something. Moreover, supposing that things must exist, it must be possible to give a reason
why they must exist in this way and not otherwise.”. Italics in original.
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The Two Principles Assumptions about the Po∃ and the PoA
A1. Answerable in General – For a problem to be answerable in general is for there to be an
answer to the problem, even if it is never discovered or is unknowable. Essentially,
what’s being assumed is that the Po∃ and the PoA are answerable, even if never
answered.
A2. Knowable in Particular – For an answer to be knowable in particular is for there to be a
finite individual capable of understanding the answer, even if it is never discovered.
Essentially, what’s being assumed is that the answer(s) to the Po∃ and the PoA are
knowable, even if never known.
A1 ensures that only responses that consider the Po∃ and the PoA to be legitimate
problems are acceptable; whilst A2 ensures that only responses that consider the inquiry into the
Po∃ and the PoA to be potentially fruitful are acceptable. The primary function of these two
assumptions is to limit the variety of responses to the Po∃ and the PoA, e.g., “deflationary”
responses to the Po∃ and the PoA violate A1, and as such are not considered herein. However,
there are additional implications of the assumptions. For example, an implication of A2 is that an
acceptable answer to the Po∃ and the PoA must end the inquiry—else the answer would be
infinite and as such a finite individual would be incapable of understanding it.
Infinite Regress Answers
Infinite regress answers are committed to the claim that the “chain of causes” as it were,
extends infinitely backward, or said differently, that “for every cause, there is a cause prior to
that cause” (which I refer to as the axiom of regression). The obvious problem with infinite
regress answers is that if you don’t have a starting point, you cannot go anywhere. The best
analogy I can think of is someone trying to count backward from the last digit of pi to 3. There is
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no last digit of pi, so you obviously can’t count back from that digit to 3 (or any other digit of pi
for that matter). Put simply, you can’t make progress on something you haven’t started, or said
differently, progress cannot be made on that which has not begun. If the reader disagrees on this
point, consider the following:
Suppose you’re a prisoner tasked with moving rocks from Yard A to Yard B.
Suppose further that you’ve been instructed to begin with the smallest rock and
then go to the next largest one and so on. Suppose even further that when you
pick up what seems to be the smallest rock in Yard A, call it Rock 1, you discover
an even smaller rock underneath it. In accordance with your instructions, you set
aside Rock 1 (leaving it in Yard A), and pick up the smaller rock underneath it,
call it Rock 2, only to discover that there is yet another smaller rock underneath it.
Suppose this process of finding progressively smaller rocks underneath what
seems to be the smallest rock in Yard A continues ad infinitum. Will you ever
move a rock from Yard A to Yard B? 2
I’m inclined to say that the answer is “no”, and the reason for this is quite simple. In
order to begin your task of moving rocks from Yard A to Yard B you must find the smallest rock
in Yard A. There is always a smaller rock underneath what seems to be the smallest rock in Yard
A. This makes the task of finding the smallest rock in Yard A an infinite one. So, in order to
begin your task of moving rocks from Yard A to Yard B, you must first complete an infinite task.
Infinite tasks cannot be completed. Therefore, you cannot begin your task of moving rocks from
Yard A to Yard B.

2

Note: Ignore the obvious problem regarding the size of rocks.
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Now, instead of rocks, imagine that you have been tasked with reciting the decimal
expansion of π backward. In order to determine where to start, you would have to complete a
recitation of the decimal expansion of π forward. However, as with the rocks, this is an infinite
task. Infinite tasks cannot be completed. So, you cannot ever begin reciting the decimal
expansion of π backward.
The basic point I am trying to make here is that the reverse of a task, more accurately a
process (even an infinite process) shares the same general properties as the original process,
while the dispositional properties are reversed. For example, when reciting π forward, one cannot
start at the end and work one’s way back, but one can start at the beginning (3) and work one’s
way forward. When reciting π backward, one cannot start at the beginning and work one’s way
forward, but one can start at the end (3) and work one’s way back. The dispositional properties
(e.g., what counts as the start/end) are all reversed when the process is reversed, but the general
properties (e.g., incompletability) remain unchanged. 3 Which means that just as the decimal
recitation of π forward cannot be completed because it cannot end, so it is that the decimal
recitation of π backward cannot be completed because it cannot begin. 4
Since an infinite regress answer to the Po∃ requires that an infinite process analogous to
the decimal recitation of π backward be completable, and infinite processes cannot be completed,
an infinite regress answer to the Po∃ cannot be true. Said differently, if an infinite regress answer

Note: The reader may be tempted to object at this point and bring up some supposed counter-example. For
example, the process of an egg rolling off a counter and shattering against the ground. Intuitively, this process
cannot be reversed, at least not in the same way that the assembly of a bicycle can be reversed. However, when I say
that a process is reversable, I mean simply that it is conceptually reversible. Though I should point out that
technically the egg un-shattering and floating back onto the counter is physically possible.
4
Note: If the reader thinks it necessary in making this point, they may assume that I herein reject the notion of an
infinite totality.
3
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to the Po∃ is true, then it is also true that infinite processes can be completed. Infinite processes
cannot be completed. Therefore, an infinite regress answer to the Po∃ cannot be true.
Furthermore, even if we assume that the chain of causes is present “all at once” (bypassing the issue of completing infinite processes) and accept that as a sufficient answer to the
Po∃, we must then move on to the PoA and ask, “why that particular chain of causes (C1) is
present “all at once” instead of some other chain of causes (Cn)?”. If we are to answer that
question, we must appeal to something that necessitates that C1 is present “all at once” instead of
some Cn. The only thing that seems capable of necessitating that C1 is present “all at once”
instead of some Cn is some law(s). However, by appealing to said law(s) in order to solve the
PoA, we have added yet another thing which must be explained, i.e., said law(s).
Now, I do not claim to know in what sense, if any, laws “exist”, or how this might be
different, if at all, from laws being “true”. As such, I do not know to what extent, if any, it is
meaningful to return to the Po∃ with regard to laws, but that need not derail our discussion, for
the PoA, mutatis mutandis, seems to apply to laws regardless. So, we may still meaningfully ask,
“Why this law rather than some other law?” 5, 6

Note: I assume herein that laws govern rather than describe.
Note: To understand the difference between a law which describes and a law which governs, consider, for
example, Titius-Bode’s law, which roughly states that proceeding outward from the Sun, each planet is
approximately twice the distance from the Sun as the preceding planet. To be more exact, “the modern mathematical
form of Titius-Bode’s law (as expressed by Johann F. Wurm in 1787) is: rn = 0.4 + 0.3 × 2n, where n = −∞, 0, 1, 2,
3, …, and where the distance rn of the nth planet to the Sun is expressed in astronomical units.” (See, François
Graner and Bérengère Dubrulle, “Titius-Bode laws in the solar system. 1: Scale invariance explains
everything” Astronomy and Astrophysics 282 (1994): 262; Peter Lynch, “On the significance of the Titius–Bode law
for the distribution of the planets”, Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, Volume 341, Issue 4, June
2003, 1174). Titius-Bode’s law is false, as anyone who studies astronomy or astrophysics can tell you. But the
reason it is false depends on the nature of laws. If laws are merely descriptive (i.e., they describe uniform
regularities of some kind in the universe), then Titius-Bode’s law is false because it is not descriptively accurate
(e.g., Neptune is not in the spot predicted by the application of Titius-Bode’s law). However, if laws govern, then
Titius-Bode’s law is descriptively inaccurate because it is false, and as such does not govern the spatial distribution
of planets in our solar system! Moreover, presumably there are other (actually true) laws which are responsible
(together with the causes they govern) for the actual spatial distribution of planets in our solar system, and it is these
laws which are responsible for the falsehood of Titius-Bode’s law.
5
6
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In order to answer the PoA for a given law, that law (alternatively its truth), must be the
necessary consequence of some further law(s) together with certain rules of inference, which I
shall call a “chain of laws”. Now, we know that this chain of laws must be infinite (by extension
of the axiom of regression), and that the infinite chain of laws for a given law must be present
“all at once” (else we face the issue of completing infinite processes). Still, suppose we accept
this as a sufficient answer to the question at hand, we must then move again to the PoA and ask,
“why that particular chain of laws (CL1) is present “all at once” instead of some other chain of
laws (CLn)?”. If we are to answer that question, we must appeal to something that necessitates
that CL1 is present “all at once” instead of some CLn. The only thing that seems capable of
necessitating that CL1 is present “all at once” instead of some CLn is some further chain of laws.
However, this further chain of law(s) must itself be the result of an infinite chain of laws present
“all at once”, and we must ask our question, mutatis mutandis, of this new chain of laws.
As should be obvious at this point, this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum.
However, if this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum, then answering the Po∃ and the
PoA is impossible, for it requires that an infinite process analogous to the decimal recitation of π
backward be completable, and infinite processes cannot be completed. Moreover, such a series
of answers would be infinite and, as such, unknowable to a finite individual, which violates A2.
Therefore, an infinite regress answer to the Po∃ and the PoA cannot be accepted. Thus, either an
infinite regress answer to the Po∃ and the PoA cannot be true or cannot be accepted.
Ex Nihilo Answers
Ex nihilo answers are committed to the claim that “something came from nothing”, or
said differently, that “the ultimate origin of everything is nothing”. The obvious problem with ex
nihilo answers is that they all require that nothing possesses at least two properties: (1) the
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dispositional property of “beget-ability”, i.e., the ability to beget things and (2) the dispositional
property of intelligibility. However, intuitively, nothing cannot possess any properties. After all,
properties can only be possessed by existing things, so if nothing possesses properties, then it
must be an existing thing. However, nothing is supposed to be that from which existence came,
not another existing thing.
Assuming that this is in fact a problem for an ex nihilo answer, it’s an unsolvable one.
This is due to the fact that (1) is necessary to the accuracy and (2) to the intelligibility of an ex
nihilo answer to the Po∃, for if (1) is removed, then nothing cannot beget things and if (2) is
removed, then nothing cannot be put forward as a solution to the Po∃ at all. Essentially, if
nothing is to solve the Po∃, then it must be something. But if nothing is something, then it is not
nothing. Therefore, nothing cannot solve the Po∃. If the reader disagrees on this point, perhaps
the next will have the desired effect.
Suppose something came from nothing, or rather (since the relation is a tad clearer this
way), suppose nothing beget something. We may represent this claim as follows: N b S. Suppose
further that this is taken as a sufficient answer to the Po∃. We may then move on to the PoA. In
which case, the question at hand becomes “Why did nothing beget that particular something (S1),
instead of some other something (Sn)?”.
If we are to answer that question, we must appeal to something which necessitates that S1
was beget instead of some Sn. The only thing that seems to be capable of necessitating that S1
was beget instead of some Sn, is some law(s). If that’s true, then we have: nothing together with
some law(s), necessarily beget something (N + L b S1). There are two problems with this
approach: (1) in doing so, we may have given nothing still further properties, namely that of
being subject to some law(s) such that nothing cannot beget any Sn but must necessarily beget S1
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(if that is taken to be a property); and (2) we have added yet another thing which must be
explained, i.e., said law(s).
Whatever else may be the case, we know that this law(s) must be prior to S1 since it
governed S1’s being beget by nothing. So, it must have come from nothing, or else been eternal.
Of course, if it were begotten by nothing, then we may return to the PoA, new question in hand,
“Why did nothing beget that particular law(s) (L1) instead of some other law(s) (Ln)?”. If we are
to answer that question, we must again appeal to something which necessitates that L1 was beget
instead of some Ln. The only thing that seems to be capable of necessitating that L1 was beget
instead of some Ln, is some further law(s), such that we have: nothing together with some further
law(s), necessarily beget some law(s) (N + Lf, b L1). There are two problems with this
approach: (1) in doing so we may have given nothing still further properties, namely that of
being subject to some further law(s) such that nothing cannot beget any Ln but must necessarily
beget L1 (if that is taken to be a property); (2) we have added yet another thing which must be
explained, i.e., said further law(s).
As should be obvious at this point, this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum.
However, if this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum, then these laws must infinitely
regress. As such, an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃, like an infinite regress answer to the Po∃,
requires that an infinite process analogous to the decimal recitation of π backward be
completable (in this case, the completion of the begetting of an infinite hierarchy of laws, each
governing the process by which nothing beget the subsequent law(s)), and since infinite
processes cannot be completed, an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃ cannot be true. Said differently, if
an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃ is true, then it is also true that infinite processes can be completed.
Infinite processes cannot be completed. Therefore, an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃ cannot be true.
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The only alternative is to say that the law(s) governing nothing’s begetting of S1 are eternal, in
which case there will be at least one thing the ultimate origin of which is not nothing, which is
contrary to the original supposition of an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃. Therefore, an ex nihilo
answer to the Po∃ cannot be true.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the infinite hierarchy of laws was begotten
“all at once” and accept that as a sufficient answer to the Po∃, we must then move on to the PoA
and ask, “why was that particular infinite hierarchy of laws (HL1) begotten “all at once” instead
of some other infinite hierarchy of laws (HLn)?”. If we are to answer that question, we must
appeal to something which necessitates that HL1 was begotten instead of some HLn. The only
thing that seems to be capable of necessitating that HL1 was beget instead of some HLn is some
law(s). However, this law(s) must itself be begotten by some infinite hierarchy of laws, which
must itself be begotten “all at once”, and we must ask our question, mutatis mutandis, of this new
infinite hierarchy of laws.
As should be obvious at this point, this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum.
However, if this line of questioning can be repeated ad infinitum, then answering the Po∃ and the
PoA is impossible, for it requires that an infinite process analogous to the decimal recitation of π
backward be completable, and infinite processes cannot be completed. Moreover, such a series
of answers would be infinite and, as such, unknowable to a finite individual, which violates A2.
Therefore, an ex nihilo answer to the Po∃ and the PoA cannot be accepted. Thus, either an ex
nihilo answer to the Po∃ and the PoA cannot be true or cannot be accepted.
Now, suppose an ex nihilo answer, instead of claiming that nothing begets something,
simply claims that the series of states of affairs “there was nothing and then there was
something”, which we may represent as [nothing – something], is true. There are two problems
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with this. First, the Po∃ asks why the state of affairs changed from nothing to something. Simply
stating that it so changed does not answer the Po∃. Second, the PoA asks why the state of affairs
changed from nothing to the something that it did, instead of some other something, i.e., why S1
instead of some Sn, and there is nothing in the mere description of the series of states of affairs
represented by [nothing – something], by which this may be done. Therefore, an ex nihilo answer
to the Po∃ and the PoA is not an answer to the Po∃ or the PoA.
Self-Caused Cause Answers
Since there were only three (epistemically) possible answers, and we’ve eliminated two
of them, if we are correct in assuming there is a solution to the Po∃ and the PoA, it must be the
last (epistemically) possible answer, i.e., a self-caused cause answer. Self-caused cause answers
are committed to the claim that “there is something that is self-caused, which caused everything
else”, or said differently, “the ultimate origin of everything is something which is the cause of
itself”. However, as the only way to learn about a self-caused cause seems to be by deductive
reasoning from the fact that it is self-caused to the necessity of its possessing certain properties,
it’s not clear that much if anything is gained by attempting to generalize about self-caused cause
answers. Given that, I think it’s best simply to move on at this point.
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Chapter 2

Explication of Baruch de Spinoza’s Metaphysics

Baruch de Spinoza was not, as far as I can tell, concerned with the Po∃ or the PoA.
Despite that, I think Spinoza’s metaphysics can be used to construct a self-caused cause answer
capable of both solving the Po∃ and the PoA and adhering to our two assumptions. However,
Spinoza is infamously non-explanatory about, well, just about everything. So, before I can use
his metaphysics to attempt a solution to the Po∃ and the PoA, I must first explicate his
metaphysics. My approach in explicating Spinoza is largely holistic, a side-effect of which is that
more of Spinoza’s metaphysics is explicated than is ultimately used for our project. However, as
the explication for the parts of Spinoza’s metaphysics which are used for our project do not make
sense (or at least do not make as much sense) without the explication of those parts which are not
used for our project, the explication is included in its entirety.
The reader is instructed to keep the following things in mind during the explication:
1. All references to Spinoza are from (see footnote 7), though for the sake of those who may
have alternate translations, the work, section, passage, paragraph, letter number, etc., are
included prior to the page number of the reference used herein. 7
2. The passages in each section of the appendix are presented in chronological order. 8
3. The “things to note” are ordered based on the passages they are derived from, followed
by any “things to note” they may have been derived from. This occasionally results in the
reader being forced to look at later “things to note” in order to understand previous
“things to note”.

Baruch de Spinoza, Spinoza’s Complete Works. Ed. Michael L. Morgan, Trans. Samuel Shirley, Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2002. Hereafter, Spinoza.
8
Note: To the best of the author’s ability, given questions concerning the exact dates of authorship and published.
7

11

Section I – On Natura Naturans, Natura Naturata (General), and Natura Naturata (Particular)
I.

Here, before we proceed to something else, we shall briefly divide the
whole of Nature—namely, into Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata . By
Natura Naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly and
distinctly through itself, and without needing anything beside itself (like all
the attributes which we have so far described), that is, God.
The Natura Naturata we shall divide into two, a general, and a particular.
The general consists of all the modes which depend immediately on God, of
which we shall treat in the following chapter; the particular consists of all
the particular things which are produced by the general mode. So that the
Natura Naturata requires some substance in order to be well understood. 9

From the above passage it is obvious that Spinoza divides Nature into 2 general parts (the
Natura Naturans and the Natura Naturata) and three particular parts (the Natura Naturans, the
general Natura Naturata, and the particular Natura Naturata). Since the Natura Naturans is
identical to Substance (which is obvious both from the above passage and from what is said of
the Natura Naturans in E1P29S 10), and the body of this work principally deals with Substance, I
do not think it important to treat of the Natura Naturans here, beyond what I have already said
about it—except to say that it is necessarily eternal. A fact which is demonstrated quite clearly in
the body of this work and in the section of the appendix on Eternity and the Eternal. Instead, I
think it best to focus on the Natura Naturata , for an investigation into it reveals things which
might otherwise remain unknown, and which may aid in a proper understanding of Spinoza.
II.

Now, as regards the general Natura Naturata , or the modes, or creations
which depend on, or have been created by, God immediately, of these we
know no more than two, namely, motion in matter, and the understanding in
the thinking thing. These, then, we say, have been from all eternity, and to all
eternity will remain immutable.
All that specially concerns Motion, such as that it has been from all
eternity, and to all eternity will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its kind;
that it can neither be, nor be understood through itself, but only by means of
Extension—all this, I say, since it [Motion] more properly belongs to a treatise

Spinoza, ST, P1, Ch. 8, On Natura Naturans, 58.
The passage is as follows: “[B]y “Natura naturans” we must understand that which is in itself and is conceived
through itself; that is, the attributes of substance that express eternal and infinite essence; or (Cor. 1 Pr. 14 and Cor.
2 Pr. 17), God.” See, Spinoza, E1P29S, 234.

9

10
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on Natural Science rather than here, we shall not consider in this place, but we
shall only say this about it, that it is a Son, Product, or Effect created
immediately by God. 11, 12
There are a number of things of note in this passage. However, I would first like to cutoff any potential concern which the reader might have over the fact that “modes”, “creations”,
“motion in matter”, and “the understanding in the thinking thing” have not been defined. We are
not herein concerned with those particular aspects of this passage, and so they may remain
mysterious without issue. For our purposes, what matters is that the relation which the general
Natura Naturata stands in to the Natura Naturans be made clear. And on that point, there are a
few things to note:
(1) The general Natura Naturata is infinite, but only in its kind.
(2) The general Natura Naturata is not eternal.
(3) The general Natura Naturata is not conceived through itself.
(4) The general Natura Naturata is created immediately by the Natura Naturans (i.e., God, in the
passage above).
(5) The general Natura Naturata can only be or be understood through an attribute, (e.g.,
motion in matter through Extension, in the passage above).
(6) The general Natura Naturata has been from all eternity and to all eternity will remain
immutable.
We will get into what (1) means in more detail in the Section on the Finite and Infinite
(Non-finite), so we’ll leave it alone here. (2) and (3) are derivable from each other, since for
everything that can be conceived through another thing, the concept of “before” applies and so,
given the definition of eternal, cannot be eternal; and likewise, the other way around, if not
11
12

Spinoza, ST, P1, Ch. 9, On Natura Naturata, 58-59. Brackets and italics in original.
Note: Similar remarks apply to the understanding, so I’ve omitted that section for the sake of brevity.
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eternal, then not conceived through itself, since if it was conceived through itself, it would then
be eternal, given that the only things which can be conceived through themselves are self-caused
and that which is self-caused is necessarily eternal. A fact which is demonstrated quite clearly in
the body this work as well as in the section of the appendix on Eternity and the Eternal. (4) and
(5) are also derivable from each other, since if the general Natura Naturata can only be
understood through an attribute, then it must be the case that it is the first effect/creation of the
Natura Naturans; and likewise, if it’s the first effect/creation of the Natura Naturans, then it
must be the case that the general Natura Naturata can only be understood through an attribute.
From what we’ve said about (2) – (5) so far, it should be obvious what (6) means, but I shall
explain it nonetheless.
For a thing to “have been from all eternity” is for it to have been the immediate
effect/creation of an eternal thing and for a thing to “remain immutable” to “all eternity” is for it
to never stop, i.e., for the concept of “after” to be inapplicable to it without contradiction. So, the
general Natura Naturata is such that the concept of “before” applies to it and the concept of
“after” does not apply to it. And since the only way to “have been from all eternity” is to be an
immediate effect/creation of the Natura Naturans (since otherwise there would be some
intermediate cause), anything which can be shown to be such that the concept of “before” applies
to it and the concept of “after” does not apply to it, will have been shown to be a general mode,
and as such to belong to the general Natura Naturata.
Now, as for the particular Natura Naturata:
III.

13

[T]he particular consists of all the particular things which are produced by the
general mode. So that the Natura Naturata requires some substance in order
to be well understood. 13

Spinoza, ST, P1, Ch. 8, On Natura Naturans, 58.
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This is fairly straightforward now that we understand the general Natura Naturata. The
particular Natura Naturata is all the implications of the general Natura Naturata or, what is
effectively the same, all the implications of the Natura Naturans, after the general Natura
Naturata. Some things to note about the particular Natura Naturata:
(1) The particular Natura Naturata is not eternal, nor from all eternity, but it does in a sense
remain immutable to all eternity.
(2) The particular Natura Naturata is not a thing in itself.
(3) The particular Natura Naturata is a collection of particular things.
(4) Within the particular Natura Naturata no particular thing remains immutable to all eternity.
As regards (1), the sense in which the particular Natura Naturata remains immutable to
all eternity is as a collection. Since if the particular Natura Naturata ended, then the whole of
Nature would be finite and a self-caused cause is necessarily infinite, so it must be the case that
the particular Natura Naturata remains immutable to all eternity. (2) and (3) are obvious from
the above passage. (4) follows from the fact that no particular thing in the particular Natura
Naturata is infinite, so cannot remain immutable to all eternity. This in turn follows from the fact
that it is the general Natura Naturata which is infinite in its kind, so nothing produced by it can
be greater nor can it produce anything equivalent, for its infinitude comes from the eternal, and
cannot be imparted except therefrom (more on that in the Section on the Infinite and Finite). So,
the particular Natura Naturata consists of everything such that the concept of “before” and
“after” applies to it.
IV.

14

By “Natura Naturata ” I understand all that follows from the necessity of
God’s nature, that is, from the necessity of each one of God’s attributes; or all
the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which
are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God. 14

Spinoza, E1P29S, 234.
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As should be obvious, both from the above passage and from what has been said about
the general Natura Naturata and the particular Natura Naturata, the Natura Naturata considered
as the second part of the whole of Nature is simply the general Natura Naturata and the
particular Natura Naturata taken together.
Section II – On Being, Real Beings, Fictitious Beings, Beings of Reason, & Entities of
Imagination 15
I.

Let us begin, then, with Being, by which I understand ‘Everything which,
when it is clearly and distinctly perceived, we find to exist necessarily or at
least possibly.’ 16
I think it should be pointed out that when Spinoza talks about Being, he seems to refer to

it as a collection in such a way that it is identical to what is more commonly referred to as
Existence. The definition, understood this way, is basically “all of the things that exist, either
necessarily or possibly”. I’ve removed the clear and distinct aspect from the definition, since I’m
not herein concerned with the epistemology, only the metaphysics. At any rate, such an
understanding of Being makes the following passage much easier to understand:
II.

And so it is easy to see how absurd is that division whereby being is divided
into real being and being of reason, for they are dividing being into being and
non-being, or into being and a mode of thinking. 17
Taking Being as a collection, what Spinoza seems to be saying here is that dividing Being

into the sub-collections of Real Being and Being of Reason is absurd because he regards those
sub-collections as nothing more than Being itself in the case of Real Being and either Nothing or
what must of necessity be a proper sub-set of Being in the case of Being of Reason, both of

15
Note: Real beings, real things, and the real all refer to the same thing. Beings of reason, mental constructs, things
of reason, and Entia Rationis all refer to the same thing. For simplicity’s sake, I shall only refer to them as real
beings and beings of reason.
16
Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [Definition of Being.], 178.
17
Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [Being is wrongly divided into
Real Being and Being of Reason.], 179.
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which are unhelpful divisions. But what exactly Spinoza meant here will become clearer as we
progress through this section, so we need not dwell on it any longer. In the next passage, Spinoza
lays out what he thinks is the proper division of Being:
III.

From the definition, or, if you prefer, the description of being already given, it
is easy to see that being should be divided into being that exists necessarily of
its own nature (i.e., whose essence involves existence) and being whose
essence involves only possible existence. This last is divided into Substance
and Mode […]. 18
What Spinoza seems to be saying here is that Being should be divided into two sub-

collections. One for all the things that exist necessarily and another for all the things that exist
possibly. Which given the definition/description that Spinoza gave for Being, necessarily add up
to the entirety of Being. Moreover, the name for the collection of things which exist necessarily
is Substance and the name for the collection of things which exist possibly is Mode.
I.

Therefore, as long as we are engaged in an enquiry into real things, it will
never be permissible for us to draw a conclusion from what is abstract, and we
shall take great care not to mix the things that are merely in the intellect with
those things that are in reality. 19

II.

Hence we can see that it is above all necessary for us always to deduce our
ideas from physical things, i.e., from real beings, advancing, as far as we can,
in accordance with the chain of causes from one real being to another real
being […]. 20

III.

Therefore many who are not used to distinguishing mental constructs from
real things have ventured to assert that Duration is composed of moments,
thus falling into the clutches of Scylla in their eagerness to avoid Charybdis. 21

IV.

[I]n our investigation of things, we must beware of confusing real beings with
beings of reason. 22

Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [The division of Being.], 180.
Spinoza, TIE 93, 25.
20
Spinoza, TIE 99, 27.
21
Spinoza, L12, 787.
22
Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [In the investigation of things
Real Beings should not be confused with Beings of Reason.], 179.
18
19
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V.

VI.

Therefore, it is important to note here how easily we are deceived when we
confuse […] mental constructs [entia rationis] and abstract terms with the
real. 23
As to what you add, that from the definition of any thing, considered in itself,
we can deduce only one property, this may hold good in the case of the most
simple things, […] but not in the case of real things. 24

(1) Real beings and physical things are one and the same. [From I and II]
(2) Real beings are distinct from beings of reason. [From III, IV, V]
(3) From the definition of any real being (though perhaps not all real beings) it is possible to
deduce more than one property. [From VI]
As regards (1), if I’m correct in thinking that part of the problem with dividing Being into
Real Being and Being of Reason is that the collection Being and the collection Real Being are
equivalent and we take Spinoza at face value when he distinguishes between those things that are
“merely in the intellect” and those that are in “reality” and when he equates physical things with
real beings (from physical things, i.e., from real beings), then it seem that by logical implication,
the collection Being is equivalent to the collection of physical things. Furthermore, since the
collection Being is the collection of everything that exists (either necessarily or possibly), then it
must be the case that all the things that exist (either necessarily or possibly) are physical things. 25
(2) and (3) are both obvious from their relevant passages.
I.

A Fictitious Being excludes clear and distinct perception, because a man
merely according to his fancy—and not unknowingly, as in the case of the
false, but knowingly and wittingly—joins together what he wants to join and
separates what he wants to separate. 26

Spinoza, E2P49S, 276.
Spinoza, L83, 958.
25
Note: This appears to conflict with Spinoza’s dual-aspect theory, but it’s possible that his dual-aspect theory is a
later development or that I’m missing something. Either way, we need not concern ourselves with that here.
26
Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [The Chimera, the Fictitious
Being and the Being of Reason are not beings.], 178.
23
24
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II.

[A] fictitious being […] has no existence outside the mind. [I]f attention is
correctly paid to the definitions just given of being of reason and fictitious
being, a considerable difference will be found between them […]. [W]e
defined fictitious being as the connecting of two terms by mere act of will
without any guidance of reason, and therefore a fictitious being can chance to
be true. 27
There are a few things to note in this passage:

(1) Fictitious beings are caused by joining together or separating ideas by mere act of will
without any guidance of reason. [From I and II]
(2) Fictitious beings are ideas. [From I and II]
(3) Fictitious beings are distinct from beings of reason. [From II]
(4) Fictitious beings can by chance be true, i.e., a fictitious being can by chance correspond to a
real being. [From II]
(5) A Fictitious being is an idea of a being caused by the joining together or separating of ideas
by mere act of will utilizing only the imagination, which can by chance be true. [From (1), (2),
and (4)]
As regards (1), it’s important to recognize that even though Spinoza uses ‘terms’ when
defining fictitious beings, it is clear that it is ideas, i.e., that to which terms refer, which are being
joined together or separated. 28 This is obvious from the fact that terms (words) are sequences of
symbols or sounds (the joining together or separating of which can only ever cause other
sequences of symbols or sounds) and sequences of symbols or sounds cannot be true or false.
However, we know from II that fictitious beings can by chance be true and by implication can

Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [How a Being of Reason and
Fictitious Being are to be distinguished.], 179-180.
28
Note: For Spinoza, ideas are mental narrations, i.e., mental accounts, of nature, which can be true or false
depending on if the idea agrees with its object (ideatum), i.e., true or false depending on if there really is in fact an
object in nature to which the idea corresponds. See, Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 6, Of the One, the True, and the Good,
[What is the true and what the false, both in the common acceptance and according to philosophers.], 187. and
Spinoza, L60, 912-913.
27
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also be false, so they cannot be caused by terms. As an example of how one might cause a
fictitious being, consider Pegasus. Pegasus is a fictitious being formed by the joining of three
ideas: (i) of a horse; (ii) of wings; and (iii) of the ability to fly. Joined together these ideas result
in an idea of a flying winged horse, i.e., Pegasus. As far as the guidance of reason caveat is
concerned, that seems to just be Spinoza’s way of saying that this the process of causing
fictitious beings takes place solely in the imagination, and in no way involves the intellect.
As regards (2), if fictitious beings were not ideas, then Spinoza’s pointing out that
fictitious beings (i) exclude clear and distinct perception, (ii) do not exist outside the mind, (iii)
are caused by the joining together or separating of ideas by mere act of will and (iv) can be true,
would all be wholly misplaced. The reason for this being that clear and distinct perception
regards ideas; ideas do not exist outside the mind; only ideas can be caused by mere act of will;
and ideas are true or false. None of (i) – (iv) apply to things, but all of them apply to ideas. As
such, it is clear that fictitious beings are ideas. Furthermore, from (1) we know that fictitious
beings are caused by the joining together or separating of ideas, so unless it’s the case that
simply joining together and separating ideas can produce something other than another idea, it’s
obvious that fictitious beings must be ideas.
(3) is obvious from II, though I shall not say anything about the nature of the
considerable differences between fictitious beings and beings of reason until the part of this
section on beings of reason.
As regards (4), suppose I were to join together the ideas of a Horse and a Narwhal Horn
in such a way as to imagine a horse with a narwhal horn on its head, call this imagined being a
unicorn. Suppose further that unbeknownst to me, someone had in fact spliced narwhal DNA
into a horse, resulting in a horse with a narwhal horn on its head, i.e., suppose further that
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someone had in fact created a unicorn. It would then be the case that by chance my idea of a
being (which I referred to by the term ‘unicorn’) was true.
(5) is obvious from (1), (2), and (4).
I.

Some things are in our understanding and not in Nature, and so they are also
only our own creation, and their purpose is to understand things distinctly:
among these we include all relations, which have reference to different things,
and these we call Entia Rationis [things of reason]. 29

II.

Nor again can the Modes of Substance ever be correctly understood if they are
confused with such mental constructs (entia rationis) or aids to the
imagination. 30

III.

[A] Being of Reason is nothing but a mode of thinking, which serves the more
easily to retain, explain, and imagine things that are understood. Here it
should be noted that by a mode of thinking we understand […] all
modifications of thought, such as intellect, joy, imagination, etc. 31

(1) Beings of reason include all relations. [From I]
(2) Beings of reason are mental constructs, and vice versa. [From I and II]
(3) Beings of reason are distinct from the modes of substance. [From II]
(4) Beings of reason are distinct from aids to the imagination. [From II]
(5) A being of reason is a mode of thinking. [From III]
(6) A being of reason serves to either retain, explain, or imagine. [From III]
(7) Modes of thinking are distinct from beings of reason. [From III]
(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) are all obvious from their relevant passages, so I won’t go
into them. As regards (7), it should suffice to point out that there are modes of thinking other
than beings of reason. However, before we move on to the next passage, I’d like to point out that
Spinoza categorizes beings of reason as a sub-category of modes of thinking according to their

Spinoza, ST, Ch. 10, What Good and Evil Are, 59.
Spinoza, L12, 789.
31
Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [The Chimera, the Fictitious
Being and the Being of Reason are not beings.], 178.
29
30
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behavior, i.e., by what they serve to do (retain, explain, or imagine). Now, while behavioral
categorization is perfectly fine in itself (e.g., there’s nothing wrong with the classification
carnivore), I am herein more interested in the conceptual structure of beings of reason, i.e., what
they are, conceptually speaking. The source of my greater interest is that I believe that the
behavior of beings of reason is a product of both their conceptual structure and the constitution
of one’s mind. Such that, for example, what serves to retain for one may not serve to retain for
another. Now, while that is not a problem on a structural categorization, on a behavioral
categorization either the same being of reason would have to be allowed to be multiply
categorized, e.g., categorized as retentive and not categorized as retentive, or the conditions of
categorization would have to be watered down such that they only need to be met by someone at
some time. So, if I am right about the cause of the behavior of beings of reason, then a structural
categorization seems a less problematic method of categorizing beings of reason. I also think
such a categorization will be more informative.
IV.

That there are certain modes of thinking that serve to retain things more firmly
and more easily, and, when we wish, to recall them to mind or to set them
before the mind, is an accepted fact for all those who make use of that wellknown rule of memory. By this rule, in order to retain something that is quite
new and impress it on the memory, we have recourse to another thing,
familiar to us, that has something in common with it either in name or in
actuality. Similarly, philosophers have arranged all natural things in fixed
classes, to which they have recourse when they encounter something new.
These classes they call genus, species, etc. 32
The example that Spinoza gives of a mode of thinking serving to retain is “a well-known

rule of memory”, which I shall henceforth refer to as mnemonic linking. The example of
biological taxonomy does not involve anything unique to biological taxonomy, or indeed to any

Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [By what modes of thinking we
retain things.], 178-179.
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taxonomy, but only to relational grouping.33 So, I shall henceforth refer to it as the relational
grouping example.
The relational grouping example is described as “similar” to mnemonic linking, but it is
not entirely clear wherein the similarity lies. It could be that the similarity lies in the fact that
when one encounters something new, e.g., a new species, say, homo erectus, that the thought of
this new species can be retained “more firmly and more easily” by linking it to something else
that one is familiar which “has something in common with it either in name or in actuality”, e.g.,
another species, say, homo sapiens, which incidentally has something in common with homo
erectus both in name and in actuality. But if that is the case, then mnemonic linking and the
relational grouping example are not similar, the latter is an example of the former. In which case,
the use of ‘similarly’ seems out of place. So, perhaps there is something else that mnemonic
linking, and the relational grouping example have in common.
The process described in the relational grouping example, i.e., of having recourse to a
pre-existing grouping of things when encountering something new, does not appear particularly
retentive. Rather, it seems more organizational, i.e., relational groupings seem to serve to order
rather than to retain or put differently, they answer the question “where does X fit?”, not “how
can X be retained?”. So, the similarity does not appear to lie in what mnemonic linking and
relational grouping serve to do. Perhaps it is simply the act of “having recourse to something”
that is supposed to be similar, with what said recourse serves to do being the point of
dissimilarity. Though that doesn’t strike me as particularly plausible since the act of “having
recourse to something” hardly seems like it needs an example to be understood. At any rate, let’s

Note: I say relational grouping, to emphasize that the grouping is by some criteria. As I did not want to dismiss
out of hand the possibility of arbitrary groupings.
33
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examine mnemonic linking and relational grouping in more detail to see if there is a similarity in
their conceptual structure.
To illustrate mnemonic linking, imagine your thoughts as a series of orbs. When one
encounters some neoteric orb (new thought, call it NO1) that one wishes to retain one need only
take some primary orb (familiar thought, call it PO1), find some string with which the two can be
tied together (identity some commonality 34 between NO1 and PO1), and tie them together with the
string (use that commonality to connect them). The string (commonality) will then be the link
(relation 35) by which NO1 and PO1 are connected. Said differently, the choice of string (the
commonality chosen) is the criterion by which the orbs (thoughts) are linked. 36 Then, when one
wishes to recall NO1 one need only recall PO1 and follow the string to NO1. NO1 will then be a
secondary orb (call it SO1) unless and until it becomes so familiar that it can be recalled without
the use of PO1, at which point it will be a primary orb (call it PO2).
The conceptual structure here is the connecting of orbs (thoughts) to other orbs (thoughts)
by some string (criterion). Now, while this may often help in retaining things 37, that does not
appear to be a necessary aspect of the conceptual structure. Rather, the conceptual structure is
one which given the constitution of our minds may serve to retain things. For it seems easy to
imagine some creature for which this process of linking is a hinderance to retaining things. If so,
then mnemonic linking is only mnemonic if it is actually serving to retain things, and otherwise is
simply linking, i.e., the connecting of thoughts to other thoughts by some criteria.

Note: I define a commonality as: The thought of a real, perceived, or imagined aspect of one of more things,
which themselves may be real, perceived, or imagined, that can be used to connect a thought to itself or to other
thoughts.
35
Note: I define a relation as: A commonality, when being used to connect thoughts. In other words, a commonality,
when being used to connect thoughts, constitutes a relation between those thoughts.
36
Note: The choice of commonality matters only on a practical level.
37
Note: I myself frequently make use of this linking process to help remember things.
34
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To illustrate relational grouping, imagine your thoughts as a series of orbs. Suppose you
survey some of your orbs (thoughts) and find that some of them have commonalities with each
other that they do not have with other orbs (you identify some commonalities between some but
not all of your orbs). So, you select an umbrella to place those orbs (thoughts) under (you select
one of the commonalities to connect the orbs) and put them all under the umbrella (use that
commonality to connect them) The umbrella (commonality) will then be the link (relation) by
which your orbs are grouped. Said differently, the choice of umbrella (the relation chosen) is the
criterion by which the orbs (thoughts) are grouped. Now, for any orb (thought) that you survey
in the future, if that orb (thought) has the same commonality as those orbs grouped under the
aforementioned umbrella, then it is placed under said umbrella (placed into the same relation as
the aforementioned orbs).
The conceptual structure here, as in linking, is the connecting of orbs (thoughts) to other
orbs (thoughts) by some umbrella (criterion). The umbrella is the criterion by which the orbs are
connected, just as the string is in linking. Now, as with linking, while this may help in retaining
things, that does not appear to be a necessary aspect of the conceptual structure. Rather, the
conceptual structure is one which given the constitution of our minds may serve to retain things.
So, it appears that the process of linking, and the process of relational grouping have the same
conceptual structure. I refer to any being of reason with this conceptual structure (i.e., any being
of reason formed by the connecting of thoughts to other thoughts by some criteria) as a
Relational Being.
V.

Again, we have modes of thinking for explicating a thing by determining it in
comparison with another thing. The modes of thinking by which we do this
are called time, number, measure, and such others as there are. Of these, time
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serves to explicate duration, number (discrete quantity), and measure
(continuous quantity). 38
All the examples of modes of thinking which serve to explicate by determining a thing in
comparison to another thing (time, number, and measure) along with the things they serve to
explicate (duration, discrete quantity, and continuous quantity) are all treated in another section
of the appendix, so they shall be skipped here.
VI.

Finally, because we are also accustomed to depict in our fantasy images of all
the things that we understand, it comes about that we imagine non beings
positively as beings. For the mind, considered only in itself, because it is a
thinking thing, has no greater power to affirm than to deny. But because to
imagine is nothing other than to sense those traces found in the brain from the
motion of the spirits, which is excited in the senses by objects, such a sensing
can only be a confused affirmation. Hence it comes about that we imagine as
beings all the modes that the mind uses to negate, such as blindness, extremity
or limit, boundary, and darkness. 39
Modes of thinking that serve to imagine are relatively simple both in behavior and

structure. As it says it VI, they are non-beings imagined positively as beings. In other words,
they are nothing more than absences thought of as presences, or what is the same, they are
negatives thought of as positives. For example, blindness is the absence of sight, darkness of
light, and limit, extremity, and boundary of continuation. But we often think about and even refer
to, e.g., darkness, as if it is a thing. I refer to any being of reason with this conceptual structure
(i.e., any being of reason formed by the thought of the absence of one thing as the presence of
another) as an Imaginative Being.
VII.

Hence it is evident that these modes of thinking are not ideas of things and can
in no way be classed as ideas. So they also have no object (ideatum) that
exists of necessity or that can exist. The reason why these modes of thinking
are taken for ideas of things is that they originate and arise so immediately

Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [By what modes of thinking we
explicate things.], 178.
39
Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [By what modes of thinking we
imagine things.], 178.
38
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from real beings that they are easily confused with them by those who do not
pay careful attention. Hence they have even given them names as if to signify
beings existing outside our mind; and these beings, or rather non beings, they
have called beings of reason. 40
(1) Beings of reason are not ideas of things (i.e., not ideas of real beings). [From VII]
(2) Beings of reason are not ideas (because nothing outside the mind to which they correspond).
[From VII]
(3) A Being of reason does not have an object that exists of necessity or that can exist (i.e., the
object of a being of reason does not correspond to anything outside the mind). [From VII]
(4) A mode of thinking may be an idea. [From VII]
Before getting into (1), (2), and (3), it’s important to note what ideas (of things) are and
what it is for an idea to have an object, for Spinoza. For Spinoza, ideas are mental narrations, i.e.,
mental accounts, of nature. Ideas can be true or false depending on if the idea agrees with its
object (ideatum), i.e., true or false depending on if there really is in fact an object in nature to
which the idea corresponds. 41 All beings of reason are, is a way or method of thinking about
things. For example, the product of connecting thoughts via some commonality (i.e., a relational
being) is a method of thinking about those thoughts, namely from the prospective of that relation.
Now that we have a general understanding of Spinoza’s notion of ideas, it’s much easier
to see what is meant by (1), (2), and (3). (1) concludes that beings of reason aren’t ideas of things
(which may suggest that you can have ideas of, e.g., states of affairs, not just objects, but that’s a
topic for another time), and further points out (2), i.e., that beings of reason cannot in any way be
classified as ideas (which suggests that there is a fundamental distinction between beings of

Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [Why beings of reason are not
ideas of things, and yet are taken to be such.], 178-179.
41
Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 6, Of the One, the True, and the Good, [What is the true and what the false, both in the
common acceptance and according to philosophers.], 187; L60, 912-913.
40
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reason and ideas). And, as such, (3), i.e., beings of reason have no object that exists of necessity
or that can exist (though they do have an object as will be seen from VIII and IX). As regards
(4), it should suffice to point out that VII only explicitly says that these modes of thinking (i.e.,
beings of reason) cannot in any way be classed as ideas, so it is at least epistemically possible
that there is some mode of thinking that is also an idea, though I rather doubt there is such a
mode of thinking.
VIII.

IX.

No less absurdly does he speak who says that a being of reason is not a mere
nothing. For if he seeks outside the intellect what is meant by those words, he
will find it is mere nothing, whereas if he understands them as modes of
thinking, they are true real beings. For when I ask what is species, I am only
enquiring into the nature of that mode of thinking that is in fact a being and is
distinct from another mode of thinking. However, these modes of thinking
cannot be termed ideas nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love
cannot be called true or false, but only good or bad. 42
From all that has been said already, it is obvious that there is no agreement
between real being and the objects (ideata) of a being of reason. 43, 44

X.

[I]f attention is correctly paid to the definitions just given of being of reason
and fictitious being, a considerable difference will be found between them
both from consideration of their cause and also from their own nature without
regard to cause. For we defined fictitious being as the connecting of two terms
by mere act of will without any guidance of reason, and therefore a fictitious
being can chance to be true. But a being of reason neither depends solely on
the will nor does it consist of any terms joined together, as is quite obvious
from the definition. 45

XI.

As to what you add, that from the definition of any thing, considered in itself,
we can deduce only one property, this may hold good in the case of the most

Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [In what way a Being of Reason
can be termed a mere nothing, and in what way it may be termed Real Being.], 179.
43
Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [In the investigation of things
Real Beings should not be confused with Beings of Reason.], 179.
44
Note: When talking about the objects of a being of reason, Spinoza uses ideata not ideatum. This may have been
done deliberately in order to help maintain the distinction between the objects of ideas and the objects of beings of
reason, though I cannot confirm that.
45
Spinoza, MT, P1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [How a Being of Reason and
Fictitious Being are to be distinguished.], 179-180.
42
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simple things, or in the case of mental constructs (entia rationis), in which I
include figures […]. 46
(1) Beings of reason do not correspond to anything outside the mind, i.e., the object of a being of
reason is not a real being [From VIII and IX]
(2) Beings of reason are modes of thinking. [From VIII]
(3) Modes of thinking are real beings. [From VIII]
(4) Beings of reason are real beings [From VIII, also from (2) and (3)]
(5) Beings of reason are not ideas. [From VIII]
(6) Beings of reason cannot be true or false [From VIII]
(7) Modes of thinking may be ideas. [From VIII]
(8) Modes of thinking may be true of false. [From VIII]
(9) Beings of reason have an object. [From VIII and IX, also from (1)]
(10) There are considerable differences between fictitious beings and beings of reason from
consideration of their cause and from consideration of their nature without regard to cause.
[From X]
(11) Beings of reason include all figures. [From XI]
(1) is obvious from VIII and especially from IX. (2) and (3) are obvious from VIII. (4) is
obvious from VIII and is an implication of (2) and (3). (5) and (6) are obvious from VIII. As
regards (6) and (7), it should suffice to point out that VIII only explicitly says that these modes
of thinking cannot be termed ideas and that they cannot be said to be true or false, so it is at least
epistemically possible that there is some mode of thinking that is also an idea and likewise for
some mode of thinking also being true or false, though I rather doubt there is such a mode of
thinking on either point. (9) is obvious from IX. (10) is obvious from what has already been said
46

Spinoza, L83, 958.
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about fictitious beings and beings of reason, but the most important difference is probably that
fictitious beings are ideas whereas beings of reason are not ideas. Unfortunately, this is not the
place for a greater exposition on the differences between fictitious beings and beings of reason,
so for now, that shall have to suffice. (11) is obvious from XI.

47
48

I.

When men become convinced that everything that is created is created on
their behalf, they were bound to consider as the most important quality in
every individual thing that which was most useful to them, and to regard as of
the highest excellence all those things by which they were most benefited.
Hence they came to form these abstract notions to explain the natures of
things: Good, Bad, Order, Confusion, Hot, Cold, Beauty, Ugliness; and since
they believed that they are free, the following abstract notions came into
being: Praise, Blame, Right, Wrong. 47

II.

All that conduces to well-being and to the worship of God they call Good, and
the contrary, Bad. And since those who do not understand the nature of things,
but only imagine things, make no affirmative judgments about things
themselves and mistake their imagination for intellect, they are firmly
convinced that there is order in things, ignorant as they are of things and of
their own nature. For when things are in such arrangement that, being
presented to us through our senses, we can readily picture them and thus
readily remember them, we say that they are well arranged; if the contrary, we
say that they are ill arranged, or confused. And since those things we can
readily picture we find pleasing compared with other things, men prefer order
to confusion, as though order were something in Nature other than what is
relative to our imagination. 48

III.

Other notions, too, are nothing but modes of imagining whereby the
imagination is affected in various ways, and yet the ignorant consider them as
important attributes of things because they believe—as I have said—that all
things were made on their behalf, and they call a thing’s nature good or bad,
healthy or rotten and corrupt, according to its effect on them. For instance, if
the motion communicated to our nervous system by objects presented through
our eyes is conducive to our feeling of well-being, the objects which are its
cause are said to be beautiful, while the objects which provoke a contrary
motion are called ugly. Those things that we sense through the nose are called
fragrant or fetid; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, tasty or tasteless; those
that we sense by touch are called hard or soft, rough or smooth, and so on.
Finally, those that we sense through our ears are said to give forth noise,
sound, or harmony. […] All this goes to show that everyone’s judgment is a
function of the disposition of his brain, or rather, that he mistakes for reality

Spinoza, E1, Appendix, 241-242.
Spinoza, E1, Appendix, 242.
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the way his imagination is affected. Hence it is no wonder—as we should note
in passing—that we find so many controversies arising among men, resulting
finally in skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many respects,
there are very many differences, and so one man thinks good what another
thinks bad; what to one man is well ordered, to another is confused; what to
one is pleasing, to another is displeasing, and so forth. 49
(1) Modes of imagining are not attributes (properties) of things. [From I, II, and III]
As regards (1), I think it will be beneficial to explain a bit more about what’s going on in
these passages before trying to explain it. The first passage (I) is fairly straightforward.
According to Spinoza, people believe on an individual level that all things that have been created
have been so created for their own sake (the individualist interpretation here is borne out in the
third passage). Spinoza goes on to claim that this viewpoint has led people to view the qualities
of things that are most useful to them as those qualities which are most important and to view
those things which most benefit them as those things which are of the highest excellence. The
ultimate result of this being the formation of certain abstract notions, e.g., good, bad, order,
confusion, etc.
The second and third passages (II-III) detail some of these abstract notions, including
how they’ve come about. The first half of the process is essentially as follows: if the experience
of something (P) is found to be a particular way (Q), then the thing which is thought to be the
cause of that experience (R) is said to be a certain way or to have a certain attribute/property (S).
For example, if the experience of praying (P) is found to be conducive to well-being and
conducive to the worship of God (Q), then praying (R), is said to be Good (S). Likewise, if the
experience of a diagram of the solar system (P) is found to be such that it can be being readily
pictured and can be readily remembered (Q), then the diagram of the solar system (R) is said to

49

Spinoza, E1, Appendix, 242.
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be Well-Arranged or Ordered (S). Similarly, if the experience of a painting (P) is found to be
conducive to well-being (Q), then the painting (R) is said to be beautiful (S).
The second half of the process is essentially as follows: the thing which is thought to be
the cause of some experience (R) being a certain way or having a certain attribute/property (S) is
explained as the cause of (is used to explain why) the experience of something (P) being found to
be a particular way (Q). For example, praying (R) being Good (S), is used to explain why the
experience of praying (P) is found to be conducive to well-being and conducive to the worship of
God (Q). Likewise, a diagram of the solar system (R) being Well-Arranged or Ordered (S) is
used to explain why the experience of the diagram of the solar system (P) is found to be such that
it can be being readily pictured and can be readily remembered (Q). Similarly, a painting (R)
being beautiful (S), is used to explain why the experience of the painting (P) is found to be
conducive to well-being (Q).
In effect, what’s happening here is that in the first half of the process people are
mistakenly attributing a property (S) to an action, object, etc., (R) based on the fact that their
experience of that action, object, etc., (P) was found to be a certain way (Q) and in the second
half of the process people are mistakenly using the action, object, etc., (R) having that property
(S) to provide a causal explanation for their experience of that action, object, etc., (P) being
found to be a particular way (Q). For example, if the experience of touching a 400° stove top (P)
is found to be greater than the normal “heat” sense experience of touching things and/or a
hinderance to well-being (Q), then the stove (R) is attributed the property “hot” (S). The stove
(R) being or having the property “hot” (S) is then used to explain why the experience of touching
the 400° stove top (P) was found to be greater than the normal “heat” sense experience of
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touching things and/or a hinderance to well-being (Q). It is by this process that Spinoza thinks
that mankind “mistakes for reality the way his imagination is affected”. 50
In actuality, “hot” is not a property of the stove, or of anything for that matter. Moreover,
the cause of the sensory experience is not any property of the stove. Or, at least, no property of
the stove alone is the cause of the sense experience. The property of the stove that is relevant
here is the temperature (molecular kinetic energy), but there are other factors which contribute to
causing the sensory experience, e.g., the body of the individual experiencing it. For example, the
sensory experiences of humans with regard to temperature convey information about the
direction and rate of the transfer of molecular kinetic energy. If the direction of transfer is from
the object being touched to the individual touching said object, then one will experience the
“heat” sensation, and the object will be said to be “hot”. The intensity of the “heat” sensation,
and thus the extent to which the object is said to be “hot”, depends on the rate of transfer. If the
direction of transfer is from the individual touching an object to the object being touched by said
individual, then the individual will experience the “cool” sensation, and the object will be said to
be “cold”. The intensity of the “cool” sensation, and thus the extent to which the object is said to
be “cold”, depends on the rate of transfer.
As such, the same object can product different sensory experiences depending on the
state of the body of the individual sensing it. For example, if an individual places their right hand
into a bucket of 50° water and their left hand into a bucket of 150° water, waits for a while, then
places both their hands into the same bucket of 100° water, their right hand will experience the
“heat” sensation and their left hand will experience the “cool” sensation. Consequently, by the
process described above, the bucket of 100° water will be attributed both the “hot” property and
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Spinoza, E1, Appendix, 242.

33

the “cold” property. Similar situations can easily be thought of for the other modes of imagining
that Spinoza talks about, e.g., good and bad, beautiful and ugly, ordered and confused, etc., but I
shall not spend time on that here. The bucket of water example should suffice (at least for now)
to demonstrate that such things as “hot” and “cold” are not properties of objects. Rather they are
modes of imagining which have been projected onto objects and given names as if they were
entities existing independently of the imagination. Understood in this way, it’s obvious why “we
find so many controversies arising among men” and why “one man thinks good what another
thinks bad”, etc.
IV.

We see therefore that all the notions whereby the common people are wont to
explain Nature are merely modes of imagining, and denote not the nature of
anything but only the constitution of the imagination. And because these
notions have names as if they were the names of entities existing
independently of the imagination I call them “entities of imagination” [entia
imaginationis] rather than “entities of reason” [entia rationis]. 51, 52

(1) Modes of imagining denote the constitution of the mind. [From IV]
(2) Entities of imagination are modes of imagining. [From IV]
(3) Modes of imagining are distinct from entities of imagination. [From IV]
(4) Entities of imagination are distinct from beings of reason. [From IV]
(5) Modes of imagining are distinct from beings of reason. [From IV]
(1) is obvious from the relevant passage. (2) is obvious from the fact that entities of
imagination are just those modes of imagining which “have names as if they were the names of
entities existing independently of the imagination” and as such are a proper sub-set of modes of
imagining. (3) is obvious from the fact that modes of imagining include entities of imagination
and more. (4) and (5) are obvious from what has already been said about entities of imagination,

Spinoza, E1, Appendix, 243.
Note: The second half of the process described above is the manner “whereby the common people are wont to
explain Nature”.
51
52
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modes of imagining, and being of reason. Though the reasons which can be discovered from
what has already been said are different from the reason Spinoza gives (in particular the
differences in their respective conceptual structures). Furthermore, we can deduce that modes of
imagining are a proper sub-set of modes of thinking from BoRIII, which helps to differentiate
them from Beings of Reason, which are another proper sub-set of modes of thinking.
Section III (a) – On Definition and the Difference Between Spinozistic and Aristotelian Essence
I.

[A] thing be conceived either through its essence alone or through its
proximate cause. That is, if the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, selfcaused, then it will have to be understood solely through its essence; if the
thing is not in itself and needs a cause for its existence, then it must be
understood through its proximate cause. 53
From the above passage (I) it is obvious that Spinoza divides all things into two general

categories: (1) self-caused and (2) other-caused. Furthermore, he includes the two ways by which
these two kinds of things can be conceived: (1) solely through their essence (if self-caused) or (2)
through their proximate cause (if other-caused). Since there are two general categories of things
and two distinct ways of conceiving of them (one for each general category) there must then be
two distinct ways of defining things (for the same method of definition would obviously not
work for both). But before we get into the two ways of defining things, it’s important to
understand what Spinoza says about definitions in general, which brings us to our next passage:
II.

53
54

For a definition to be regarded as complete, it must explain the inmost essence
of the thing, and must take care not to substitute for this any of its properties.
[…] If [a circle] is defined as a figure in which the lines drawn from the center
to the circumference are equal, it is obvious that such a definition by no means
explains the essence of a circle, but only one of its properties. And although,
as I have said, this is a matter of little importance when it is a question of
figures and other mental constructs, it is nevertheless a matter of prime
importance when it is a question of physical and real beings. For the
properties of things are not understood as long as their essences are not
known. 54

Spinoza, TIE 92, 25.
Spinoza, TIE 95, 25-26.
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There are a few things to note about this passage:
(1) The essence of a thing is distinct from the properties of the thing. [From II]
(2) Distinguishing between essence and properties is of little importance when it comes to beings
of reason. [From II]
(3) Distinguishing between essence and properties is of prime importance when it is a question
of physical and real beings. [From II]
(4) The properties of beings of reason can be understood even if their essences are not known.
[From II]
(5) The properties of things are not understood as long as their essences are not known. [From
II]
Be aware that Spinoza considers a circle to be a figure, which is a kind of mental
construct, and we know from BoRI-II that mental constructs are beings of reason. 55 (1) is obvious
from the above passage, but it is essential to understanding that Spinoza’s notion of essence and
Aristotle’s notion of essence are distinct. This is apparent from the fact that Aristotle’s notion of
essence is the essential properties of a thing, whereas Spinoza plainly distinguishes between the
properties of a thing and its essence. (2) is obvious from the above passage. (3) is obvious from
the above passage and is explained by (5). As regards (3), the separation of “physical and real
beings” is interesting. Elsewhere (S2, RB) I claimed that physical things and real beings are one
and the same. This understanding can still be maintained here, though the phrasing in this
passage is not nearly as supportive of such an interpretation. That being said, if real beings and
physical things are not the same, then it is quite difficult to ascertain what exactly real beings are.
(4) require some explanation to be made apparent. Given that (5) is used to explain (3), it seems
Note: This point is also made especially clear in L83, “mental constructs (entia rationis), in which I include
figures”. See, Spinoza, L83, 958.
55
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reasonable to infer that the reason for (2) is (4), i.e., that the properties of beings of reason can be
understood even if their essences are not known. So, (4) is inferred from (5), (3), and (2), and
explains (2). As for how the properties of beings of reason can be understood even if their
essences are not known, I cannot yet be certain, though that does seem to be an implication of the
above passage. At any rate, I suspect it is because (or at least has something to do with the fact
that) beings of reason are multiply realizable. Sadly, this is not the place for a protracted
discussion on that matter. So, we shall have to leave it at that. (5) is obvious from the above
passage. As regards (5), presumably one can be aware of the properties of a thing even without
knowing their essence, one simply does not understand them. Which I presume means one does
not see why the thing in question has the properties that it has, only that it has them.
Now, for the definition of a created (other-caused) thing:
III.

So, if we are to be delivered from this fault, the following requirements
must be satisfied in definition.
1. If the thing be a created thing, the definition, as we have said, must include
its proximate cause. For example, according to this rule a circle would have to
be defined as follows: a figure described by any line of which one end is fixed
and the other movable. This definition clearly includes the proximate cause.
2. The conception or definition of the thing must be such that all the properties
of the thing, when regarded by itself and not in conjunction with other things,
can be deduced from it, as can be seen in the case of this definition of a circle.
For from it we clearly deduce that all the lines drawn from the center to the
circumference are equal. 56

Figure 1.

56
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There are a few things to note about this passage:
(1) The definition of a created (other-caused) thing must include its proximate efficient cause,
but that is not necessarily all it includes. [From III-1]
(2) The definition of a created (other-caused) thing must be such that the thing can be deduced
from it. [From III-1]
(3) All the non-relational properties of a thing must be deducible from the definition of the
thing. [From III-2]
Be aware that when it comes to beings of reason (and perhaps modes of thinking in
general), the proximate efficient cause included in the definition need only be a convenient way
of forming the concept in question. As such, any proximate efficient cause the inclusion of which
is sufficient to produce the concept may be used, even if it is known that nothing has ever been
produced in such a manner. 57 As regards (1), it’s important to note that the inclusion of a thing’s
proximate efficient cause is a necessary not a sufficient condition for a complete definition. So,
presumably, the definition can include other things, e.g., laws of nature, geometric postulates,
rules of inference, etc. 58 (2) allows the second requirement to be satisfied, for if the thing were
not deducible, then its properties would certainly not be. (3) is obvious from the relevant
passage. 59

Spinoza, TIE 72, 20. The relevant passage is as follows: “[T]o form the concept of a sphere, I invent a cause at
will, namely, that a semicircle rotates about its center, and a sphere, as it were, is produced by this rotation.
[A]lthough we know that in Nature no sphere has ever been produced in this way, this is nevertheless […] a very
convenient way of forming the concept of a sphere.”
58
Note: That the proximate cause must be the proximate efficient cause is apparent from L60, “the idea or definition
of the thing should express its efficient cause”. That Spinoza’s thoughts on definition here and in L60 are the same is
apparent from a reading of L60. See, Spinoza, L60, 912-913.
59
Note: Regarding the definition of general things, e.g., circles, it’s interesting to note that Aristotle’s notion of
essence is actually a deducible implication of Spinoza’s notion of essence. Since all the properties of general things
are the essential properties of those things (in the Aristotelian sense). Though this does not work when it comes to
specific things, e.g., a specific circle, since that will have other non-relational properties which are not essential
properties (in the Aristotelian sense), e.g., size.
57
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As for the definition of an uncreated (self-caused) thing:
IV.

The requirements for the definition of an uncreated thing are as follows:
1. That it should exclude every cause; that is, that the thing should need
nothing else for its explanation besides its own being.
2. That, given the definition of the thing, there should remain no room for
the question: Does it exist?
3. That, as far as the mind is concerned, it should contain no substantives
that can be put in adjectival form; that is, it should not be explicated
through any abstractions. 60
4. And finally (although it is not really necessary to make this
observation), it is required that all its properties can be deduced from its
definition. 61

There are a few things to note about this passage:
(1) The definition of an uncreated (self-caused) thing must be such that the thing explains itself.
[From IV-1]
(2) The definition of an uncreated (self-caused) thing must be such that the thing is necessarily
existing. [From IV-2]
(3) The definition of an uncreated (self-caused) thing cannot involve abstractions. [From IV-3]
(4) All the properties of an uncreated (self-caused) thing must be deducible from its definition.
[From IV-4]
(1) and (2) are obvious from their relevant passages. As regards (3), the reason for this
condition is that it is impossible for an uncreated (self-caused) thing to be conceived abstractly.
So, if the definition involves abstracts, then something has gone wrong. The reason for this

Note: Substantives stand in the place of things (nouns). In this context it seems to be referring to substantive
adjectives, i.e., those which replace rather than modify a noun. For example, “the strongest always win”. Adjectives
modify nouns by attributing properties to them, so a substantive adjective replaces a noun with an
adjective/property. It’s not entirely clear to me whether that is the same as being explicated through an abstraction or
if the presence of substantive adjectives allows for explication through some abstraction, but that need not concern
us here. (See, Janice Siegel, “Latin Grammar Review Sheets: Substantives”, Dr. J’s Illustrated Guide to the
Classical World, December 14, 2021).
61
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impossibility is that an uncreated (self-caused) thing is necessarily unique and infinite, i.e., a
total being beyond which there is nothing. However, it is necessarily the case that when
conceived in an abstract manner, things are extended further in the intellect than they are in
nature. But it is impossible for a total being to be extended further in the intellect than in Nature,
so a self-caused cause cannot be conceived abstractly. 62 (4) is obvious from the relevant passage.
V.

1. The true definition of each thing involves and expresses nothing beyond
the nature of the thing defined. Hence it follows that—
2. No definition involves or expresses a fixed number of individuals, since
it expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For example, the
definition of a triangle expresses nothing other than simply the nature of a
triangle, and not a fixed number of triangles. 63

As regards V, the first part (V-1) is consistent with everything said up to this point about
definitions and doesn’t seem to tell us anything new or interesting. The second part (V-2) is
interesting in that it only seems to hold true for the definitions of beings of reason, e.g., circles or
triangles (though it may extend to modes of thinking in general). The definition of a specific
thing obviously involves or expresses a fixed number of individuals (namely, one), since the
definition is of that specific thing.
Section III (b) – On Formal Essence, Actual Essence, and Existence
I.

[F]ormal essence is not self-generated nor again is it created—for both of
these would presuppose that it is a thing existing in actuality—but it depends
on the divine essence alone, in which all things are contained. And so, in this
sense we agree with those who say that the essences of things are eternal. 64

Spinoza, TIE 76, 21. The relevant passage is as follows: “As for our knowledge of the origin of Nature, we need
have no fear of confusing it with abstractions. For when things are conceived in an abstract way (as is the case with
all universals), they always have a wider extension in the intellect than is really possessed by their particular
exemplifications existing in Nature. Again, since there are many things in Nature whose difference is so slight as to
be hardly perceptible to the intellect, it can easily come about that they are confused if they are conceived in an
abstract way. But since, as we shall later see, the origin of Nature can neither be conceived in an abstract or
universal way, nor can it have a wider extension in the intellect than in reality, nor has it any resemblance to things
mutable […]. For this entity is unique and infinite; that is, it is total being, beyond which there is no being.”
63
Spinoza, E1P8S2, 220.
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Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 2, What Essence Is, What Existence Is, What Idea Is, and What Potency Is, [A reply to
certain questions concerning Essence.], 181.
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II.

Finally, if any philosopher still doubts whether essence is distinguished from
existence in created things, he need not toil away over definitions of essence
and existence in order to remove that doubt. For if he merely approaches a
sculptor or a woodcarver, they will show him how they conceive in set order a
nonexistent statue and thereafter bring it into existence for him. 65

III.

[W]ith respect to the contradiction involved in its essence, a chimera is
incapable of existence. 66

IV.

[F]rom the given definition of any one thing the intellect infers a number of
properties which necessarily follow in fact from the definition (that is, from
the very essence of the thing). 67

V.

I say that there pertains to the essence of a thing that which, when granted, the
thing is necessarily posited, and by the annulling of which the thing is
necessarily annulled; or that without which the thing can neither be, nor be
conceived, and, vice versa, that which cannot be or be conceived without the
thing [also being or being conceived]. 68

(1) Formal essence is not self-generated (self-caused) or created (other-caused). [From I]
(2) Formal essence is not a part of Being. [From (1)]
(3) Formal essence is not a Substance or a Mode [From (2)]
(4) Formal essence depends only on the divine essence. [From I]
(5) Formal essence is an implication, but not a creation of the Natura Naturans. [From I and (4)]
(6) Formal essence is eternal. [From I and (5)]
(7) Formal essence is the hypothetical chain of causes which are sufficient to bring about a given
thing. [From II]
(8) Actual essence is the actual chain of causes which necessarily bring about a given thing.
[From II]

Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 2, What Essence Is, What Existence Is, What Idea Is, and What Potency Is, [How the
distinction between essence and existence is easily learned.], 182.
66
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [In how
many ways a thing is said to be necessary or impossible.], 183.
67
Spinoza, E1P16P, 227.
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Spinoza, E2D2, 244. Items in brackets added.
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(9) For a thing to be brought into existence is for its formal essence to be actualized.
(10) Existence is the effect of the actualization of formal essence. [From II and (6)]
(11) A chimera has a formal, but not an actual, essence. [From I, II, and III]
(12) A chain of causes pertains to the essence of a thing if (a) the chain is sufficient to cause the
thing and (b) each link in the chain is necessary to cause the thing. [From V]
(1) is obvious from the relevant passage. (2) is obvious from (1) and from what has
already been said about Being. (3) is obvious from (2) and what has already been said about
Being with relation to Substance and Mode. (4) is obvious from the relevant passage, though its
precise meaning will not become clear until the section of the appendix on Necessity,
Impossibility, Contingency, and Possibility. As regards (5), formal essence cannot be part of the
Natura Naturata for it is not a mode, else it would be created (other-caused), which we know
from the first passage (I) is not the case. Therefore, it must be an implication, but not a creation
of the Natura Naturans.
As regards (7) and (8), consider how the sculptor/woodcarver conceived in set order a
chain of causes such that when granted x (the statue) is necessarily posited, then proceeded to
bring about in set order said chain of causes, thereby bringing the statue into existence. From this
we may learn the distinction between formal and actual essence. The formal essence of a thing is
the hypothetical chain of causes which are sufficient to bring about the thing. Whereas the actual
essence of a thing is the actual chain of causes which necessarily bring about the thing. As regard
(9) and (10) it is easy to see from the second passage (II) and from (7) and (8) that for a thing to
be brought into existence is nothing other than for its formal essence to be made actual, i.e., for
its formal essence to be actualized. So, existence is the effect of the actualization of formal
essence. As regards (11), it should be obvious at this point that the formal essence of a chimera is
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a chain of contradictory causes. The contradiction involved in its formal essence means that it is
impossible to actualize its formal essence. Hence, it is impossible for it to exist.
As regards the fourth passage (IV), it should be obvious that by conceiving in set order a
chain of causes such that when granted x is necessarily posited, one conceives of the existence of
x, and from that, one can infer all its properties. For example, the sculptor/woodcarver in the
second passage (II) by conceiving in set order a chain of causes such that when granted x (the
statue) is necessarily posited, also conceives the existence of x (the statue), and from that can
infer all the properties of x (the statue).
As regards (12), we’ve already determined that Spinoza’s notion of essence is causal, but
it isn’t until the fifth passage (V) that Spinoza lays out a method for determining which causes
pertain to the essence of a thing. 69 A chain of causes pertains to the essence of a thing if: 70
(1a) granting said chain of causes necessarily posits said thing and (2a) annulling
any link in said chain of causes necessarily annuls said thing. 71
(1b) said thing cannot be or be conceived without every link in said chain of
causes [also being or being conceived] and (2b) said chain of causes cannot be or
be conceived without said thing [also being or being conceived]. 72
(1b-v2) it is impossible for said thing to be or be conceived without every link in
said chain of causes [also being or being conceived] and (2b-v2) it is impossible

Note: The use of pertains, rather than is, may suggest that the essence of things includes more than causes. The
reader may recall that a similar observation was made in Section III (a), regarding the definition of a created (othercaused) thing.
70
Note: (1a) and (2a) correspond to the condition listed in the first half of the fifth passage (V), i.e., the part before
the semi-colon; (1b) and (2b) correspond to the condition listed in the second half of the fifth passage (V), i.e., the
part after the semi-colon; and (1b-v2) and (2b-v2) are simply restatements of (1b) and (2b).
71
If (1a) granting a given chain of causes necessarily posits a given thing AND (2a) annulling any link in said chain
of causes necessarily annuls said thing, then said chain of causes pertains to the essence of said thing.
72
If (1b) a given thing cannot be or be conceived without every link in a given chain of causes [also being or being
conceived] AND said (2b) chain of causes cannot be or be conceived without said thing [also being or being
conceived], then said chain of causes pertains to the essence of said thing.
69
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for said chain of causes to be or be conceived without said thing [also being or
being conceived]. 73
(1a), (2b), and (2b-v2) set a condition of sufficiency on the proposed chain of causes as a whole
to the causation of the thing, while (2a), (1b), and (1b-v2) set a condition of necessity for each
link in the proposed chain of causes to the causation of the thing.
Section IV – On Necessity, Impossibility, Contingency, and Possibility
I.

II.

I call a thing impossible if its nature implies that it would be a contradiction
for it to exist; necessary, if its nature implies that it would be a contradiction
for it not to exist. 74
There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary or impossible,
either [1] with respect to its essence or [2] with respect to its cause. 75

III.

With respect to essence we know that God necessarily exists, for his essence
cannot be conceived without existence; whereas, with respect to the
contradiction involved in its essence, a chimera is incapable of existence. 76

IV.

With respect to cause, things (e.g., material things) are said to be either
impossible or necessary. For if we have regard only to their essence, we can
conceive that clearly and distinctly without existence; therefore they can never
exist through the force and necessity of their essence, but only through the
force of their cause, God, the creator of all things. So if it is in the divine
decree that a thing should exist, it will necessarily exist; if not, it will be
impossible for it to exist. For it is self-evident that if a thing has no cause for
existence—either than internal or an external cause—it is impossible for it to
exist. 77

V.

2. Not only the existence of created things but also, as we shall later on
demonstrate with the greatest certainty in Part 2, their essence and their nature
depend solely on God’s decree. Hence it clearly follows that created things

If (1b-v2) it is impossible for a given thing to be or be conceived without every link in a given chain of causes
[also being or being conceived] and (2b-v2) it is impossible for said chain of causes to be or be conceived without
said thing [also being or being conceived], then said chain of causes pertains to the essence of said thing.
74
Spinoza, TIE 53, 14.
75
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [In how
many ways a thing is said to be necessary or impossible.], 183. Items in brackets added.
76
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [In how
many ways a thing is said to be necessary or impossible.], 183.
77
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [In how
many ways a thing is said to be necessary or impossible.], 183.
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have no necessity of themselves; for they have no essence of themselves, nor
do they exist of themselves. 78
VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

Finally, the necessity such as in created things by virtue of their cause is so
called either [1] with respect to their essence or [2] with respect to their
existence; for these two are distinct in created things, the former [1]
depending on the eternal laws of nature, the latter [2] on the series and order
of causes. 79
This [the lack of any real contingency] is readily apparent from our teaching
in Axiom 10 Part 1, to wit, that the same force is required in creating a thing
as in preserving it. So no created thing affects anything by its own force, just
as no created thing began to exist by its own force. From this it follows that
nothing happens except by the power of the all-creating cause—that is, God—
who by his concurrence at every moment continues to create all things. 80
Now because nothing happens except by the divine power alone, it is easy to
see that those things that happen do so by the force of God’s decree and will.
But because there is in God no inconstancy or variability (by Prop. 18 and
Cor. Prop. 20 Part 1), he must have resolved from eternity to produce those
things that he is now producing. And because nothing has a more necessary
existence than that which God has decreed should exist, it follows that the
necessity to exist has been from eternity in all created things.3, 81
[T]he essence of the thing, considered in itself, is nothing other than God’s
decree, or his determinate will. But we are also saying that the necessity of
existence is no different from the necessity of essence (Chapter 9 of Part 2);
that is, when we say that God has decreed that the triangle should exist, we are
saying nothing other than that God has so arranged the order of nature and of
causes that the triangle should necessarily exist at a particular time. So if we
were to understand the order of causes as established by God, we should find
that the triangle must exist at a particular time with the same necessity as we
now find, when we attend to the triangle’s nature, that its three angles are
equal to two right angles. 82

Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [Created
things depend on God for their essence and existence.], 183.
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Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [The
necessity that is in created things from their cause is either of essence or of existence; but these two are not
distinguished in God.], 183-184. Items in brackets added.
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Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 3, Concerning the Necessary, the Impossible, the Possible, and the Contingent, [The
Possible and the Contingent are only the defect of our intellect.], 184.
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Possible and the Contingent are only the defect of our intellect.], 184.
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78

45

X.

XI.

XII.

[I]f men clearly understood the whole order of Nature, they would find all
things to be equally as necessary as are the things treated in mathematics. But
because this is beyond the reach of human knowledge, certain things are
judged by us as possible and not as necessary. Therefore we must say either
that God is powerless—because all things are in actual fact necessary—or that
God is all-powerful, and that the necessity we find in things has resulted
solely from God’s decree. 83
[T]he universal laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are
determined are nothing but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve
eternal truth and necessity. 84
[I]t is solely from the necessity of the divine nature, and not from the
necessity of the essence and nature of a triangle, that the nature of a triangle is
thus contained in the divine nature—or rather, the necessity of the essence and
properties of a triangle, insofar as they are also conceived as eternal truths,
depends not on the nature of a triangle but solely on the necessity of the divine
nature and intellect. 85

XIII.

Now since nothing is necessarily true save by the divine decree, it quite
clearly follows that the universal laws of Nature are merely God’s decrees,
following from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature. So, if
anything were to happen in Nature contrary to her universal laws, it would
also be necessarily contrary to the decree, intellect and nature of God. 86

XIV.

[W]hatever occurs does so through God’s will and eternal decree; that is, as
we have already shown, all that happens does so in accordance with laws and
rules which involve eternal necessity and truth. Nature, then, always observes
laws and rules involving eternal necessity and truth although these are not all
known to us, and thus it also observes a fixed and immutable order. 87

XV.

[A]ll things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and
to act in a definite way. 88

XVI.

Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other
order than is the case. 89

XVII.

All things have necessarily followed from the nature of God (Pr. 16) and have
been determined to exist and to act in a definite way from the necessity of

Spinoza, MT, Pt. 2, Ch. 9, Of God’s Power, [All things are necessary with respect to God’s decree. It is wrong to
say that some things are necessary in themselves, and other things with respect to his decree.], 202.
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86
Spinoza, TTP, Ch. 6, Of Miracles, 445.
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God’s nature (Pr. 29). Therefore, if things could have been of a different
nature or been determined to act in a different way so that the order of Nature
would have been different, then God’s nature, too, could have been other than
it now is, and therefore (Pr. 11) this different nature, too, would have had to
exist, and consequently there would have been two or more Gods, which (Cor.
1 Pr. 14) is absurd. Therefore, things could not have been produced by God in
any other way or in any other order than is the case. 90
XVIII.

A thing is termed “necessary” either by reason of its essence or by reason of
its cause. For a thing’s existence necessarily follows either from its essence
and definition or from a given efficient cause. Again, it is for these same
reasons that a thing is termed “impossible”—that is, either because its essence
or definition involves a contradiction or because there is no external cause
determined to bring it into existence. 91

(1) Necessity or impossibility of essence (conceptual necessity/impossibility) depends
only on essence. [From I, III, IV, XVIII]
(2) A thing is necessary or impossible either (a) with respect to its essence or (b) with respect to
its cause. [From II]
(3) Necessity or impossibility of cause is so either (i) with respect to essence or (ii) with respect
to existence. [From VI]
(4) Necessity or impossibility of cause with respect to essence (nomological necessity/
impossibility) depends on the eternal universal laws of Nature. [From VI and VIII]
(5) Necessity or impossibility of cause with respect to existence (causal necessity/
impossibility) depends on the series and order of causes. [From VI and IX]
(6) The source and force of necessity or impossibility is always the same regardless of if said
necessity or impossibility is conceptual, nomological, or causal. [From V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII,
XIII, XVII, (8), and (9)]

90
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Spinoza, E1P33P, 236.
Spinoza, E1P33S1, 236.
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(7) For all things, essence, properties, and existence are equally necessary or impossible. [From
V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII, and (6)]
(8) The eternal universal laws of Nature follow from the Divine Nature, i.e., the eternal universal
laws of nature are a logical implication of Substance (i.e., that which is self-caused). [From XI
and XIII]
(9) The order of Nature (the series and order of causes) follows from the eternal universal laws
of Nature, i.e., the order of Nature is a logical implication of the eternal universal laws of Nature,
and by extension is a logical implication of Substance (i.e., that which is self-caused). [From
XIV, XV, XVI, XVII]
It’s integral to note here that among the eternal universal laws of Nature is one according
to which “there must be infinite things in infinite ways”. That particular eternal universal law of
Nature plays an especially important role in understanding nomological necessity. (1) is obvious
from the relevant passages, but its precise meaning is in need of explication. A thing is necessary
of its essence if its existence is contained in its essence, i.e., if it’s contradictory to suppose that it
doesn’t exist, e.g., Substance. Whereas a thing is impossible of its essence if its non-existence is
contained in its essence, i.e., if its essence contains a contradiction, e.g., a square circle. I refer to
this necessity/impossibility as conceptual necessity/impossibility. (2) and (3) are obvious from
the relevant passages.
(4) is obvious from the relevant passages, but its precise meaning is in need of
explication. A thing is necessary of its cause with respect to essence if its essence is not contrary
to the eternal universal laws of Nature, i.e., if its formal essence contains nothing which requires
that the eternal universal laws of Nature be different in order to be actualized, e.g., a dodo bird
(the formal essence of which is obvious not contrary to the eternal universal laws of Nature since
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dodo birds did in fact exist). Whereas a thing is impossible of its cause with respect to essence if
its formal essence is contrary to the eternal universal laws of Nature, i.e., if its formal essence
contains something which requires that the eternal universal laws of Nature be different in order
to be actualized, e.g., a perpetual motion machine or a spaceship that travels faster than light (the
formal essences of which are plainly contrary to the eternal universal laws of Nature). I refer to
this necessity/impossibility as nomological necessity/impossibility. It should be noted that
because among the eternal universal laws of Nature is one according to which “there must be
infinite things in infinite ways”, it is automatically necessary that anything which is not contrary
to any of the eternal universal laws of Nature exists. However, it is impossible to determine
solely from the fact that a given thing is nomologically necessary where along the chain of
causes said thing will exist, only that it will exist somewhere along the chain of causes. So,
nomological necessity/impossibility may be thought of as the necessity/impossibility to exist, or
the necessity/impossibility of existence in general.
(5) is obvious from the relevant passages, but its precise meaning is in need of
explication. A thing is necessary of its cause with respect to existence if its existence is dictated
by the series and order of causes, e.g., the existence of the reader. Whereas a thing is impossible
of its cause with respect to existence if its existence is prohibited by the series and order of
causes, e.g., the reader being Abraham Lincoln (since the series and order of causes necessitated
his death prior to the writing of this work). I refer to this necessity/impossibility as causal
necessity/impossibility. It should be noted that the existence being dictated/prohibited by the
series and order of causes is existence at some particular link along the causal chain. So, causal
necessity/impossibility may be thought of as the necessity/impossibility of existence in
particular.
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As regards (6), this follows from the fact that the eternal universal laws of Nature and the
series and order of causes (i.e., the order of Nature) are implications of Substance, which is
conceptually necessary. So, the source and force of nomological and causal necessity is in fact
nothing other than the conceptual necessity of Substance.
As regards (7), since the source and force of necessity or impossibility is always the
same, it follows that for all things, essence, properties, and existence are all equally necessary or
impossible. In other words, that a thing has a particular essence is equally as necessary as that it
has a particular set of properties, which is equally as necessary as that it has a particular
existence. (8) and (9) are obvious from the relevant passages.
I.

II.

I call a thing […] possible, if, by its very nature, neither its existence nor its
nonexistence implies a contradiction, the necessity or impossibility of its
existence being dependent on causes which are unknown to us while we are
assuming its existence. So if its necessity or impossibility, which are
dependent on external causes, were known to us, it could not then be for us
the subject of any fiction. 92
There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary or impossible,
either [1] with respect to its essence or [2] with respect to its cause. 93

III.

Finally, the necessity such as in created things by virtue of their cause is so
called either [1] with respect to their essence or [2] with respect to their
existence; for these two are distinct in created things, the former [1]
depending on the eternal laws of nature, the latter [2] on the series and order
of causes. 94

IV.

A thing is said to be possible when we understand its efficient cause but do
not know whether the cause is determined. Hence we can also consider it as
possible, but not as either necessary or impossible. 95

Spinoza, TIE 53, 14.
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distinguished in God.], 183-184. Items in brackets added.
95
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V.

VI.
VII.

VIII.

IX.
X.

XI.

XII.

But if we attend simply to the essence of the thing and not to its cause, we
shall call the thing contingent; that is, we shall consider it as midway between
God and a chimera, so to speak, because on the side of essence we find in it
no necessity to exist, as in the case of the divine essence, nor again any
inconsistency or impossibility, as in the case of a chimera […].
[T]hese two [possibility and contingency] are only the defect of our
perception, and not anything real. 96
If anyone […] attends to nature and the way it depends on God, he will find
nothing contingent in things, that is, nothing that can either exist or not exist
on the part of the thing, or is a real contingency, as it is commonly called. 97
Nor can we say that those things [i.e., created things] are contingent because
God could have decreed otherwise. For because in eternity there is no when or
before or after or any affection of time, it follows that God never existed prior
to those decrees so as to be able to decree otherwise.3, 98
Nothing in nature is contingent. 99
[I]n things there is absolutely nothing by virtue of which they can be said to
be “contingent”, […] a thing is termed “contingent” for no other reason than
the deficiency of our knowledge. For if we do not know whether the essence
of a thing involves a contradiction, or if, knowing full well that its essence
does not involve a contradiction, we still cannot make any certain judgment as
to its existence because the chain of causes is hidden from us, then that thing
cannot appear to us either as necessary or as impossible. So, we term it either
“contingent” or “possible”. 100
The essence of man does not involve necessary existence; that is, from the
order of Nature it is equally possible that a certain man exists or does not
exist. 101
I call individual things contingent insofar as, in attending only to their
essence, we find nothing that necessarily posits their existence or necessarily
excludes it. 102
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XIII.

I call individual things possible insofar as, in attending to the causes by which
they should be brought about, we do not know whether these causes are
determined to bring them about. In Sch. 1, Pr. 33, Part 1, I did not
differentiate between possible and contingent because at that point it was
unnecessary to distinguish carefully between them. 103

(1) Possibility is only epistemic. [From I, IV, VI, X]
(2) A thing is epistemically possible with respect to ignorance of its cause. [From I, IV, X, and
XIII]
(3) A thing is epistemically contingent or epistemically possible either (a) with respect to its
essence or (b) with respect to its cause. [From II]
(4) Epistemic contingency of essence depends only on essence or the ignorance thereof. [From
II, V, X, and XII]
(5) Epistemic possibility of cause is so either (i) with respect to essence or (ii) with respect to
existence. [From III]
(6) Epistemic possibility of cause with respect to essence depends on ignorance of the
eternal laws of Nature. [From III]
(7) Epistemic possibility of cause with respect to existence depends on ignorance of the
series and order of causes. [From III]
(8) Contingency is only epistemic. [From V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X]
(9) A thing is epistemically contingent with respect to its essence or the ignorance thereof. [From
V and XII]
(1), (2), and (3) are obvious from the relevant passages. As regards (4), a thing is
epistemically conceptually contingent if its existence or non-existence does not follow
solely from its essence, or if we are ignorant of the fact that it does, e.g., the existence of
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a dodo bird does not follow solely from the formal essence of a dodo bird. (5) is obvious
from the relevant passage.
As regards (6), A thing is epistemically nomologically possible if its existence or nonexistence depends on the eternal universal laws of nature and we are ignorant of said laws or are
otherwise incapable of discerning the necessity or impossibility of the thing, e.g., a dodo bird and
a spaceship that travels faster than light are epistemically nomologically possible if we are
ignorant of the eternal universal laws of nature, or if we are aware of the said laws but are
incapable of discerning that the formal essence of a dodo bird is not contrary to them or that the
formal essence of a spaceship that travels faster than light is contrary to them. 104
As regards (7), A thing is epistemically causally possible if its existence or non-existence
depends on the series and order of causes and we are ignorant of said causes or are otherwise
incapable of discerning the necessity or impossibility of the thing, e.g., a dodo bird walking
around the room during my thesis defense after being flung via catapult through the window into
said room is epistemically causally possible if we are ignorant of the fact that the series and order
of causes necessitated the extinction of the dodo bird prior to my thesis defense, or if are aware
of the series and order of causes but incapable of discerning that said series and order of causes
necessitated the extinction of the dodo bird prior to my thesis defense. 105 (8) and (9) are obvious
from the relevant passages.

Note: A thing must be epistemically conceptually contingent in order to be epistemically nomologically possible.
Note: A thing must be epistemically conceptually contingent and either nomologically necessary or epistemically
nomologically possible in order to be epistemically causally possible.
104
105
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Section V – On the Finite and Infinite (Non-Finite)
I.

[…] God […] is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are predicated, of
which attributes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind. Now, in order to
express our views clearly, we shall premise the four following propositions: 106

II.

1. That there is no finite substance but that every substance must be infinitely
perfect in its kind, that is to say, that in the infinite understanding of God no
substance can be more perfect than that which already exists in Nature. 107

III.

As regards the first, namely, that there is no finite substance, etc., should
anyone want to maintain the opposite, we would ask the following question,
namely, whether this substance is [1] finite through itself, whether it has made
itself thus finite and did not want to make itself less finite; or whether it is thus
[2] finite through its cause, which cause either could not or would not give
more? The first [alternative] is not true, because it is impossible that a
substance should have wanted to make itself finite, especially a substance
which had come into existence through itself. Therefore, I say, it is made
finite by its cause, which is necessarily God. Further, if it is finite through its
cause, this must be so either because its cause could not give more, or because
it would not give more. 108

IV.

[O]f Nature all in all is predicated, and that consequently Nature consists of
infinite attributes, each of which is perfect in its kind. 109

V.

Now the reasons why we said that all these attributes, which are in Nature, are
but one single being, and by no means different things (although we can know
them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without
another), are these: 110

VI.

1. […] there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can
be meant than such a being of which all in all must be predicated. Why?
[Because] to a being which has any essence attributes must be referred, and
the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes also must one ascribe
to it, and consequently if a being is infinite then its attributes also must be
infinite, and this is just what we call a perfect (an infinite) being. 111

VII.

To this we reply: (1) that “part” and “whole” are not true or real entities, but
only “things of reason,” and consequently there are in Nature12 neither whole
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nor parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts must be such that the parts
thereof, taken separately, can be conceived and understood one without
another. Take, for instance, a clock which is composed of many different
wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say, each wheel, cord, etc., can be
conceived and understood separately, without the composite whole being
necessary thereto. 112
VIII.

In Nature, that is, in “substantial” Extension; for if this were divided its nature
and being would be at once annihilated, as it exists only as infinite extension,
or, which comes to the same, it exists only as a whole.
But should you say: is there, in extension, no part prior to all its modes? I
say, certainly not. But you may say, since there is motion in matter, it must be in
some part of matter, for it cannot be in the whole, because this is infinite; and
whither shall it be moved, when there is nothing outside it? Therefore, it must be
in a part. My answer is: Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest
together; and this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in
extension. Should you, however, say that there is, then tell me: if you divide the
whole of extension then, as regards any part which you cut off from it in thought,
can you also separate it in nature from all [other] parts; and supposing this has
been done, I ask, what is there between the part cut off (separated) and the rest?
You must say, a vacuum, or another body {e.g., a rock}, or something of
extension itself, there is no fourth possibility. The first will not do, because there
is no vacuum, something positive and yet no body; nor the second, because then
there would exist a mode, which cannot be, since (therefore) {because} extension
as extension is without and prior to all modes. Therefore, the third; and then there
is no part but only the whole of extension (but extension one and indivisible). 113

IX.

Similarly also in the case of water, which consists of straight oblong particles,
each part thereof can be conceived and understood, and can exist without the
whole; but extension, being a substance, one cannot say of it that it has parts,
since it can neither diminish nor increase, and no parts thereof can be
understood apart, because by its nature it must be infinite. And that it must be
such, follows from this, namely, because if it were not such, but consisted of
parts, then it would not be infinite by its nature, as it is said to be; and it is
impossible to conceive parts in an infinite nature, since by their nature all
parts are finite! 114

X.

Add to this still: if it consisted of different parts then it should be intelligible
that supposing some parts thereof to be annihilated, extension might remain
all the same, and not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of

Spinoza, [ST, Pt. 1, Ch. 2], What God Is, 44.
Spinoza, ST, Pt. 1, Ch. 2n12, What God Is, 44. Items in parentheses are from footnotes in the original text. Items
in brackets are from original. Items in curly brackets added.
114
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its parts; this is clearly contradictory in what is infinite by its own nature and
can never be, or be conceived, as limited or finite. 115
XI.

The question of the infinite has universally been found to be very difficult,
indeed, insoluble, through failure to distinguish between [1] that which must
be infinite by its very nature or by virtue of its definition, and [2] that which is
unlimited not by virtue of its essence but by virtue of its cause. Then again,
there is the failure to distinguish between [2] that which is called infinite
because it is unlimited, and [3] that whose parts cannot be equated with or
explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum or minimum.
Lastly, there is the failure to distinguish between [1] that which we can
apprehend only by the intellect and not by the imagination, and [2 + 3] that
which can also be apprehended by the imagination. I repeat, if men had paid
careful attention to these distinctions, they would never have found
themselves overwhelmed by such a throng of difficulties. They would clearly
have understood [1] what kind of infinite cannot be divided into, or possess
any, parts, and [2 + 3] what kind can be so divided without contradiction.
Again, they would also have understood [2 + 3] what kind of infinite can be
conceived, without illogicality, as greater than another infinite, and [1] what
kind cannot be so conceived. 116

XII.

Substance is not manifold; rather there exists only one Substance of the same
nature. 117

XIII.

[I]f you ask why we have such a strong natural tendency to divide extended
Substance, I answer that we conceive quantity in two ways: [1] abstractly or
superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the help of the senses, or
[2] as Substance, apprehended solely by means of the intellect. So if we have
regard to quantity as [1] it exists in the imagination (and this is what we most
frequently and readily do), it will be found to be divisible, finite, composed of
parts, and manifold. But if we have regard to it as [2] it is in the intellect and
we apprehend the thing as it is in itself (and this is very difficult), then it is
found to be infinite, indivisible, and one alone, as I have already sufficiently
proved. 118

XIV.

[N]ot only have they [mathematicians] come upon many things inexpressible
by any number (which clearly reveals the inadequacy of number to determine
all things) but they also have many instances which cannot be equated with
any number, and exceed any possible number. Yet they do not draw the
conclusion that it is because of the multitude of parts that such things exceed

Spinoza, ST, Pt. 1, Ch. 2, What God Is, 44.
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all number; rather, it is because the nature of the thing is such that number is
inapplicable to it without manifest contradiction. 119
XV.

For example, all the inequalities of the space lying between the two circles
ABCD in the diagram exceed any number, as do all the variations of the speed
of matter moving through that area. Now this conclusion is not reached
because of the excessive magnitude of the intervening space; for however
small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of this small portion will still be
beyond any numerical expression. Nor again is this conclusion reached, as
happens in other cases, because we do not know the maximum and minimum;
in our example we know them both, the maximum being AB and the
minimum CD. Our conclusion is reached because number is not applicable to
the nature of the space between two non-concentric circles. Therefore if
anyone sought to express all those inequalities by a definite number, he would
also have to bring it about that a circle should not be a circle. 120

Figure 2. 121
XVI.

From all that I have said one can clearly see that [1] certain things are infinite
by their own nature and cannot in any way be conceived as finite, while [2]
other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in which they inhere; and when
the latter [2] are conceived in abstraction, they can be divided into parts and
be regarded as finite. Finally, there are [3] things that can be called infinite, or
if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be accurately expressed by any
number, while yet being conceivable as greater or less. For it does not follow
that things which cannot be adequately expressed by any number must
necessarily be equal, as is sufficiently evident from the given example and
from many others. 122

XVII.

A thing is said to be finite in its own kind [in suo genere finita] when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be
finite because we can always conceive of another body greater than it. So, too,
a thought is limited by another thought. But body is not limited by thought,
nor thought by body. 123

Spinoza, L12, 790. Items in brackets added.
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XVIII.
XIX.

XX.
XXI.

XXII.

By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. 124
I say “absolutely infinite,” not “infinite in its kind.” For if a thing is only
infinite in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is
absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and does not involve any
negation belongs to its essence. 125
Existence belongs to the nature of substance. 126
Substance cannot be produced by anything else (Cor. Pr. 6) and is therefore
self-caused [causa sui]; that is (Def. 1 ), its essence necessarily involves
existence; that is, existence belongs to its nature. 127
Every substance is necessarily infinite. 128

XXIII.

There cannot be more than one substance having the same attribute (Pr. 5),
and existence belongs to the nature of substance (Pr. 7). It must therefore exist
either as finite or as infinite. But it cannot exist as finite, for (Def. 2) it would
have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, and that substance
also would have to exist (Pr. 7). And so there would exist two substances of
the same attribute, which is absurd (Pr. 5). Therefore, it exists as infinite. 129

XXIV.

Since in fact to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite is the
unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from
Proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite. 130

XXV.

Again, if an infinite length is measured in feet, it will have to consist of an
infinite number of feet; and if it is measured in inches, it will consist of an
infinite number of inches. So one infinite number will be twelve times greater
than another infinite number. 131

XXVI.

My statement in my letter concerning the Infinite (L12), that it is not from the
multitude of parts that an infinity of parts is inferred, is clear from this
consideration: if it were inferred from the multitude of parts, we would not be
able to conceive a greater multitude of parts, but their multitude would have to
be greater than any given number. This is not true, because in the entire space
between the two non-concentric circles we conceive there to be twice the
number of parts as in half that space, and yet the number of parts both in the
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half as well as the whole of this space is greater than any assignable
number. 132
(1) A thing is divisible if it can be or be conceived as being composed of parts, each of
which can be understood by itself. [From VII, VIII, and IX]
(2) A thing is indivisible if it cannot be or be conceived as being composed of parts, each
of which can be understood by itself. [From VII, VIII, and IX]
(3) Extension must be indivisible. [From VIII]
(4) Divisibility is an implication of finitude. [From IX]
(5) Indivisibility is an implication of non-finitude. [From IX]
(6) A thing is non-finite either (a) in virtue of its essence or (b) in virtue of its cause.
[From XI and XVI]
(7) Non-finitude of essence (Conceptual Non-Finitude) depends only on essence. [From
IX, X, XI and XVI]
(8) Non-finitude of cause (Nomo-Causal Non-Finitude) depends on the eternal universal
laws of nature and the series and order of causes. [From XI and XVI]
(9) A thing is numerically inexpressible if it cannot be equated with or expressed by any
number, despite knowing its maximum and minimum, but can be conceived in
abstraction as finite, divisible, and manifold. [From XI, XIV, XV, XVI, and XXVI]
(10) A thing is manifold if there can be or be conceived multiple things of the same
nature. [From XII and XIII]
(11) A thing is one alone if there cannot be or be conceived multiple things of the same
nature. [From XII and XIII]

132
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(12) A thing is finite in its own kind if it can be or be conceived as limited by another
thing of the same kind (nature), i.e., if it can be or be conceived as less than another thing
of the same kind (nature), or what is the same, there can be or be conceived another thing
of same kind (nature) that is greater than it. [From XVII]
(13) A thing is non-finite in its own kind if it cannot be or be conceived as limited by
another thing of the same kind (nature), i.e., if it cannot be or be conceived as less than
another thing of the same kind (nature), or what is the same, there cannot be or be
conceived another thing of the same kind (nature) that is greater than it. [From XVII and
(12)]
(14) A thing is finite if it can be or be conceived as greater or less without thereby
impairing or annulling our conception of it. [From XVII, XXIII, XXIV, and (12)]
(15) A thing is non-finite if it cannot be or be conceived as greater or less without
thereby impairing or annulling our conception of it. [From XVII, XXIII, XXIV, (13), and
(14).]
(16) That a thing has infinite attributes cannot be concluded solely from the fact that said
thing is non-finite in its own kind. [XIX]
(17) A thing is endlessly divisible if it can always be or be conceived as being composed
of parts, each of which can be understood by itself. [From (1)]
(18) Anything which is one alone must be non-finite in its own kind. [From (11) and (13)]
(19) A thing is endlessly finite (potentially infinite) if it can always be conceived as greater or
less without thereby impairing or annulling our conception of it. [From 14]
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(1) and (2) are obvious from the relevant passages. (3) is obvious from the
relevant passage, but I shall explain it nonetheless. Suppose extension is divisible. Now
imagine the whole of extension (represented by the far left box, see figure 3). Suppose
you divide the whole of extension into four equal parts (represented by the middle box,
see figure 3). Suppose further that you separate one of these parts from the rest
(represented by the far left box, see figure 3). What then is there between the part thus
separated and the rest of the parts of extension? There are only three options: (a) a
vacuum, (b) a mode of extension, or (c) extension itself. The first and second are
impossible (see passage VIII). Therefore, (c), but then extension has not been divided.
Therefore, extension must be indivisible. (4), (5), and (6) are obvious from the relevant
passages.

Figure 3.
(7) is obvious from the relevant passages, but its precise meaning is in need of
explication. A thing is conceptually non-finite if its non-finitude is contained within
itself, i.e., if it is contradictory to suppose that it is finite, e.g., Substance. So, a thing
which is non-finite in virtue of its essence (conceptually non-finite) cannot be or be
conceived as finite, divisible, or manifold, without thereby annulling our conception of it.
For example, when we conceive of Substance as Substance (i.e., as conceptually
necessary, self-caused, and one alone), we cannot conceive of it as finite, divisible, or
manifold.
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(8) is obvious from the relevant passages, but its precise meaning is in need of
explication. A thing is nomo-causally non-finite if its non-finitude is contained within its
cause, i.e., if it is conceived not in itself, but in connection with its cause, it is
contradictory to suppose that it is finite, e.g., modes. So, a thing which is non-finite in
virtue of its cause (nomo-causally non-finite) cannot be finite, divisible, or manifold, but
can be conceived as such, without thereby annulling our conception of it. For example,
when we conceive of modes as a necessary implication of Substance—i.e., when we
conceive of the general existence of modes as following from the formal essence of the
modes not being contrary to the eternal universal laws of Nature and the particular
existence of modes as being dictated by the series and order of causes—we cannot
conceive of them as other than they are, without thereby annulling our conception of
them. As such, we cannot conceive of them as finite, divisible, or manifold. However,
when we conceive only of the formal essence of the modes not being contrary to the
eternal universal laws of Nature, we can conceive of the modes as finite, divisible, and
manifold, without thereby annulling our conception of them.
(9) is obvious from the relevant passages, and while its precise meaning may be in
need of explication, said explication is more appropriately addressed in the section on
Time, Number, Measure, Duration, and Quantity (Discrete and Continuous). (10), (11),
and (12) are obvious from the relevant passages. (13) is obvious from the relevant
passage and proceeds by implication of (12). (14) is obvious from the relevant passages
and by generalization of (12). (15) is obvious from the relevant passages, by
generalization of (13), and proceeds by implication of (14). (16) is obvious from the
relevant passage. (17) is obvious by implication of (1). (18) is obvious from the fact that
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if something is one alone then there is nothing to limit it, so it must be non-finite in its
own kind. (19) is obvious by implication of (14).
Section VI – On Eternity and the Eternal 133
I.

By an eternal truth I mean one which, if it is affirmative, will never be able to
be negative. Thus it is a first and eternal truth that ‘God is,’ but that ‘Adam
thinks’ is not an eternal truth. That ‘there is no Chimera’ is an eternal truth,
but not that ‘Adam does not think’. 134

II.

This [our conceiving the existence of Substance as of an entirely different
kind from the existence of Modes] is the source of the difference between
Eternity and Duration. It is to the existence of Modes alone that we can apply
the term Duration; the corresponding term for the existence of Substance is
Eternity, that is, the infinite enjoyment of existence or—pardon the Latin—of
being (essendi). 135

III.

What I have said makes it quite clear that when we have regard only to the
essence of Modes and not to Nature’s order, as is most often the case, we can
arbitrarily delimit the existence and duration of Modes without thereby
impairing to any extent our conception of them; and we can conceive this
duration as greater or less, and divisible into parts. But Eternity […] being
conceivable only as infinite, cannot be thus treated without annulling our
conception of [it]. 136

IV.

[I]n eternity there is no when or before or after or any affection of time
[…]. 137

V.

From our previous division of being into being whose essence involves
existence and being whose essence involves only possible existence, there

Note: A brief explanation of the concept of “before”, “after”, and “when”. The notions of “before” and “after”
being used herein are causal notions. So, to be “before” a thing is to be causally anterior and to be “after” a thing is
to be causally posterior. As such, the notion of “when” is more accurately understood as a notion of where a thing
lies along the chain of causes. For example, one tells someone exactly “when” a thing occurs by specifying the
immediately anterior cause and the immediately posterior cause. Such that, if one had a visual representation of the
chain of causes, then one could literally point out where the thing occurred. As such, the concept of “when” can only
apply to a thing if the concept of “before” or “after” applies to it. For example, a thing with a beginning but no end
can be pointed to along the chain of causes by finding the immediate anterior cause and a thing with no beginning,
but which has an end can be pointed to along the causal chain by finding the immediate posterior cause. But if there
is no anterior or posterior cause, then it is impossible to point to the thing along the chain of causes. Given this,
“when” must be derivative of the concepts of “before” and “after”. So, wherever I use “before” or “after”, the reader
is instructed to mentally insert “when” as well, since it is an implication of “before” and “after”.
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arises the distinction between eternity and duration. [E]ternity […] is the
attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God. 138
VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.

X.
XI.

XII.

The principal attribute that must be considered before all others is God’s
eternity, whereby […] we say that he is eternal. 139
[N]o one will ever say that the essence of a circle or a triangle, insofar as it is
an eternal truth, has lasted longer at this moment than at the time of Adam. 140
[B]ecause his being is eternal, that is, there cannot be in it any before or after,
we can never attribute duration to God without at the same time destroying the
true conception we have of him. That is to say, by attributing duration to him
we would be dividing into parts that which of its own nature is infinite and
can never be conceived except as infinite. 141
[B]ecause God’s existence is of his essence, we cannot attribute future
existence to him. For the same existence that he would then have must even
now be attributed to him in actuality; or, to speak more properly, infinite
actual existence pertains to God in the same way as infinite actual intellect
pertains to him. Now this infinite existence I call eternity, which is to be
attributed to God alone and not to any created thing, even though, I say, its
duration is without beginning or end. 142
By eternity I mean existence itself insofar as it is conceived as necessarily
following solely from the definition of an eternal thing. 143
For such existence is conceived as an eternal truth, just as is the essence of the
thing, and therefore cannot be explicated through duration or time, even if
duration be conceived as without beginning and end. 144
[T]he eternal does not admit of “when” or “before” or “after,” […]. 145

(1) The eternal is that which does not admit of “before”, or “after”, i.e., that to which the
concepts of “before”, or “after” cannot be applied without thereby impairing or annulling the
conception of that to they are being applied. [From I, VII, VIII, and XII]
(2) Eternity applies only to Substance (i.e., to that which is self-caused). [From II and V]
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 4, Of Duration and Time, [What is Eternity, Duration, and Time.], 185.
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 2, Ch. 1, Of God’s Eternity, [Duration does not pertain to God.], 190.
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(3) Eternity is conceptually non-finite existence. [From II, III, V, and IX]
(4) Eternity does not admit of “before” or “after”, i.e., the concept of “before” or “after”
cannot be applied to eternity without thereby annulling the conception of eternity as
infinite. [From III and IV]
(5) A thing with eternity is necessarily eternal. [From VI]
(6) An eternal thing necessarily has eternity. [From X and XI]
As regards (1) it is obvious from the eighth passage (VIII) and the twelfth passage (XII),
but not so obvious from the first passage (I) and the seventh passage (VII). As such, I shall
endeavor to explain it as best I can. Consider the following two true propositions: (a) “The Eiffel
Tower exists” and (b) “There are no square circles”. (a) has only been true for as long as the
Eiffel Tower has existed and will only be true so long as the Eiffel Tower continues to exist. So,
the concept of “before” can be applied to (a), since there is a link in the chain of causes anterior
to which (a) was not true, i.e., was false. There is also a link in the chain of causes where (a)
became true, namely the same link wherein the Eiffel Tower came into existence. Likewise,
there is a link in the chain of causes wherein (a) will stop being true, i.e., will become false,
namely the same link wherein the Eiffel Tower stops existing. On the other hand, there is no link
in the chain of causes anterior to which (b) was not true, i.e., was false. Nor is there a link in the
chain of causes where (b) become true. Likewise, there is no link in the chain of causes posterior
to which (b) will not be true, i.e., will be false. Moreover, to suppose the contrary, would be to
suppose that square circles exist, which is impossible.
(2) is obvious from the relevant passages, but I shall nevertheless prove that eternity does
not apply to modes. Suppose eternity applied to modes. It must then be the case that modes are
necessarily eternal, for we have established elsewhere that a thing with eternity is necessarily
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eternal. But modes are other-caused, so the concept of “before” or “after” necessarily apply to
them. So, modes are necessarily not eternal. But that is a contradiction. Therefore, eternity
cannot be applied to modes. (3) and (4) are obvious from the relevant passages.
As regards (5), suppose a thing with eternity is not eternal. It must then be the case that
the concepts of “before” or “after” can be applied to it without thereby impairing or annulling
our conception of it, i.e., there must a link in the chain of causes anterior to which said thing did
not exist or there must be a link in the chain of causes posterior to which said thing does not
exist. But in either case said thing would not have eternity, which is contradictory. Therefore, a
thing with eternity must be eternal.
As regards (6), suppose an eternal thing does not have eternity. It must then be the case
that it has duration. But in that case, the existence of said thing can be conceived as greater or
less than without thereby impairing or annulling our conception of it. But then the concept of
“before” or “after” would apply to it, i.e., then it would not be eternal. But that is a contradiction.
Therefore, an eternal thing must have eternity.
Section VII – On Time, Number, Measure, Duration, & Quantity (Discrete and Continuous)
I.

The question of the infinite has universally been found to be very difficult,
indeed, insoluble, through failure to distinguish between [1] that which must
be infinite by its very nature or by virtue of its definition, and [2] that which is
unlimited not by virtue of its essence but by virtue of its cause. Then again,
there is the failure to distinguish between [2] that which is called infinite
because it is unlimited, and [3] that whose parts cannot be equated with or
explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum or minimum.
Lastly, there is the failure to distinguish between [1] that which we can
apprehend only by the intellect and not by the imagination, and [2 + 3] that
which can also be apprehended by the imagination. I repeat, if men had paid
careful attention to these distinctions, they would never have found
themselves overwhelmed by such a throng of difficulties. They would clearly
have understood [1] what kind of infinite cannot be divided into, or possess
any, parts, and [2 + 3] what kind can be so divided without contradiction.
Again, they would also have understood [2 + 3] what kind of infinite can be
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conceived, without illogicality, as greater than another infinite, and [1] what
kind cannot be so conceived. 146
II.

This [our conceiving the existence of Substance as of an entirely different
kind from the existence of Modes] is the source of the difference between
Eternity and Duration. It is to the existence of Modes alone that we can apply
the term Duration; the corresponding term for the existence of Substance is
Eternity, that is, the infinite enjoyment of existence or—pardon the Latin—of
being (essendi). 147

III.

[W]hen we have regard only to the essence of Modes and not to Nature’s
order, as is most often the case, we can arbitrarily delimit the existence and
duration of Modes without thereby impairing to any extent our conception of
them; and we can conceive this duration as greater or less, and divisible into
parts. 148

IV.

[I]f you ask why we have such a strong natural tendency to divide extended
Substance, I answer that we conceive quantity in two ways: [1] abstractly or
superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the help of the senses, or
[2] as Substance, apprehended solely by means of the intellect. So if we have
regard to quantity as [1] it exists in the imagination (and this is what we most
frequently and readily do), it will be found to be divisible, finite, composed of
parts, and manifold. But if we have regard to it as [2] it is in the intellect and
we apprehend the thing as it is in itself (and this is very difficult), then it is
found to be infinite, indivisible, and one alone, as I have already sufficiently
proved. 149

V.

Further, from the fact that we are able to delimit Duration and Quantity as we
please, conceiving Quantity in abstraction from Substance and separating the
efflux of Duration from things eternal, there arise Time and Measure: Time to
delimit Duration and Measure to delimit quantity in such a way as enables us
to imagine them easily, as far as possible. Again, from the fact that we
separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself, and arrange them
in classes so that we can easily imagine them as far as possible, there arises
Number, whereby we delimit them. Hence it can clearly be seen that Measure,
Time, and Number are nothing other than modes of thinking, or rather, modes
of imagining. 150

VI.

If someone conceives Duration in this abstracted way and, confusing it with
Time, begins dividing it into parts, he can never understand how an hour, for
instance, can pass by. For in order that an hour should pass by, a half-hour
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must first pass by, and then half of the remainder, and the half of what is left;
and if you go on thus subtracting half of the remainder to infinity, you can
never reach the end of the hour. 151
VII.

Further, it is obvious from the above that neither Number, Measure, nor Time,
being merely aids to the imagination, can be infinite, for in that case Number
would not be number, nor Measure measure, nor Time time. Hence one can
easily see why many people, confusing these three concepts with reality
because of their ignorance of the true nature of reality, have denied the actual
existence of the infinite. 152

VIII.

[N]ot only have they [mathematicians] come upon many things inexpressible
by any number (which clearly reveals the inadequacy of number to determine
all things) but they also have many instances which cannot be equated with
any number, and exceed any possible number. Yet they do not draw the
conclusion that it is because of the multitude of parts that such things exceed
all number; rather, it is because the nature of the thing is such that number is
inapplicable to it without manifest contradiction. 153

IX.

For example, all the inequalities of the space lying between the two circles
ABCD in the diagram exceed any number, as do all the variations of the speed
of matter moving through that area. Now this conclusion is not reached
because of the excessive magnitude of the intervening space; for however
small a portion of it we take, the inequalities of this small portion will still be
beyond any numerical expression. Nor again is this conclusion reached, as
happens in other cases, because we do not know the maximum and minimum;
in our example we know them both, the maximum being AB and the
minimum CD.154 Our conclusion is reached because number is not applicable
to the nature of the space between two non-concentric circles. Therefore if
anyone sought to express all those inequalities by a definite number, he would
also have to bring it about that a circle should not be a circle. 155
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Note: That is, the conclusion is not reached due to the parameters being undefined, or (and this maybe the same)
that the conclusion is not reached due to the object being an indefinite integral, since the upper and lower limits are
known.
155
Spinoza, L12, 790.
151
152

68

Figure 4. 156
X.

From all that I have said one can clearly see that [1] certain things are infinite
by their own nature and cannot in any way be conceived as finite, while [2]
other things are infinite by virtue of the cause in which they inhere; and when
the latter [2] are conceived in abstraction, they can be divided into parts and
be regarded as finite. Finally, there are [3] things that can be called infinite, or
if you prefer, indefinite, because they cannot be accurately expressed by any
number, while yet being conceivable as greater or less. For it does not follow
that things which cannot be adequately expressed by any number must
necessarily be equal, as is sufficiently evident from the given example and
from many others. 157

XI.

Again, we have modes of thinking for explicating a thing by determining it in
comparison with another thing. The modes of thinking by which we do this
are called time, number, measure, and such others as there are. Of these, time
serves to explicate duration, number (discrete quantity), and measure
(continuous quantity). 158

XII.

From our previous division of being into being whose essence involves
existence and being whose essence involves only possible existence, there
arises the distinction between eternity and duration. […] Duration is the
attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things, insofar as
they persevere in their actuality. From this it clearly follows that duration is
distinguished only by reason from the total existence of a thing. For as much
as you take away from the duration of a thing, so much you necessarily take
away from its existence. 159

XIII.

Now in order that duration may be determined, we compare it with the
duration of other things that have a fixed and determinate motion, and this
comparison is called time. Therefore time is not an affection of things, but a
mere mode of thinking, or, as we have previously called it, a being of reason;
for it is a mode of thinking serving to explicate duration. 160

XIV.

[W]ith regard to duration we should note […] that it is conceived as longer
and shorter and as if composed of parts, and, secondly, that it is an attribute of
existence only, not of essence. 161

XV.

Again, if an infinite length is measured in feet, it will have to consist of an
infinite number of feet; and if it is measured in inches, it will consist of an

Spinoza, L12, 790.
Spinoza, L12, 790. Items in brackets added.
158
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [By what modes of thinking we
explicate things.], 178.
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Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 4, Of Duration and Time, [What is Eternity, Duration, and Time.], 185.
160
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 4, Of Duration and Time, [What is Eternity, Duration, and Time.], 186.
161
Spinoza, MT, Pt. 1, Ch. 4, Of Duration and Time, [What is Eternity, Duration, and Time.], 186.
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infinite number of inches. So one infinite number will be twelve times greater
than another infinite number. 162
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.

Duration is the indefinite continuance of existing. 163
I say “indefinite” because it can in no way be determined through the nature
of the existing thing, nor again by the thing’s efficient cause which necessarily
posits, but does not annul, the existence of the thing. 164
[D]uration, that is, existence insofar as it is considered in the abstract as a kind
of quantity. 165
My statement in my letter concerning the Infinite (L12), that it is not from the
multitude of parts that an infinity of parts is inferred, is clear from this
consideration: if it were inferred from the multitude of parts, we would not be
able to conceive a greater multitude of parts, but their multitude would have to
be greater than any given number. This is not true, because in the entire space
between the two non-concentric circles we conceive there to be twice the
number of parts as in half that space, and yet the number of parts both in the
half as well as the whole of this space is greater than any assignable
number. 166

(1) A thing is numerically inexpressible if it cannot be equated with or expressed by any
number, despite knowing its maximum and minimum, but can be conceived in
abstraction as finite, divisible, and manifold. [From I, VIII, IX, X, XIX, (10), and (14)]
(2) Duration applies only to Modes (i.e., to that which is other-caused). [From II]
(3) A thing with duration is necessarily not eternal, i.e., duration necessarily admits of
“before” or “after”, i.e., the concept of “before” or “after” necessarily apply to duration.
[From II, III, V, XVI, XVIII, (2), and (5)]
(4) Duration is existence conceived in abstraction as a kind of quantity. [From II, III,
XIV, XVI, and XVIII]

Spinoza, E1P15S, 225.
Spinoza, E2D5, 244.
164
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(5) Duration is nomo-causally non-finite, i.e., it cannot be finite, divisible, or manifold,
but when conceived in abstraction can be conceived as such. [From III, XII, and XIV]
(6) Quantity is nomo-causally non-finite, i.e., it cannot be finite, divisible, or manifold,
but when conceived in abstraction can be conceived as such. [From IV]
(7) Quantity conceived in abstraction is conceived either as (a) discrete or (b)
continuous. [From V]
(8) Time, Number, and Measure are modes of imagining. [From V, VII]
(9) Time, Number, and Measure are modes of thinking. [From V, VII, XI, XIII, and BoRIII]
(10) Quantity conceived in abstraction as discrete is explicated by Number. [From V and
XI]
(11) Quantity conceived in abstraction as continuous is explicated by Measure. [From V
and XI]
(12) Duration conceived in abstraction as a kind of continuous quantity is explicated by
Time. [From V, VI, XI, XIII]
(13) The actually infinite exists in reality. [From VII and XV]
(14) Time, Number, and Measure are beings of reason. [From XI and XIII]
(15) The duration of a mode cannot be determined solely from the formal essence or
from the properties of said mode. [From XVII]
(1) is obvious from the relevant passages, but what exactly is meant by
numerically inexpressible is in need of explication. It is obvious from the relevant
passages that when Spinoza talks about the third kind of infinite (i.e., the numerically
inexpressible), he is talking about what we now commonly refer to as uncountably
infinite sets with a definite range, e.g., the set of real numbers between 0 and 1, or to use
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Spinoza’s example, the inequalities of the space lying between the two circles ABCD in
the diagram in Letter 12, or the variations of the speed of matter moving through that
area. These are numerically inexpressible because no number can be given that will
encompass all the inequalities of the space/variations of the speed of matter. Moreover, as
number for Spinoza refers to the natural numbers, which are discrete and have a definite
and determinate order of succession; whereas the real numbers are not discrete and do not
have a definite and determinate order of succession (in fact they cannot have a definite
and determinate order of succession), the concept of number employed by Spinoza
simply cannot apply to the third kind of infinite (the numerically inexpressible) The
numerically inexpressible is endlessly divisible and endlessly finite (both as greater and
as lesser), as is readily discernable from the nineteenth passage (XIX). (2) is obvious
from the relevant passage.
(3) is obvious from the relevant passages, but I shall explicate it nonetheless.
Duration is non-finite in virtue of its cause (nomo-causally non-finite). Anything which is
non-finite in virtue of its cause must have a cause other than itself (i.e., must be othercaused). The concept of “before” applies to everything that is other-caused. Therefore, a
thing with duration is necessarily not eternal. (4) is obvious from the relevant passages.
As regards (5), the general existence of modes follows necessarily from the
eternal universal laws of Nature and the particular existence of modes follows from the
series and order of causes. So, the existence of modes cannot be other than it is. Thus,
duration cannot be finite, divisible, or manifold. Nor can the total existence of a mode,
following as it does necessarily from the eternal universal laws of Nature and the series
and order of causes be conceived as finite, divisible, or manifold. However, if we
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conceive only of the general existence of modes as following necessarily from the eternal
universal laws of Nature, then we can conceive of the particular existence of modes as
finite, divisible, and manifold, without thereby impairing or annulling our conception of
them. In this way, the actual duration of a mode depends on the series and order of
causes. (6), (7), (8), and (9) are obvious from the relevant passages.
(10) is obvious from the relevant passages, but what exactly is meant by number
is in need of explication. When we conceive of the modes of Substance in abstraction
from Substance, we can arrange them into classes (groups), e.g., dogs, cats, humans.
When we do this, we also conceive of these groups as having units, a dog, a cat, a human.
In order that we might imagine these units as easily as possible we created the system of
natural numbers. Now, discrete quantity is not conceived as endlessly divisible, so
neither is the system of natural numbers, e.g., just as there is no such thing as half a dog,
cat, or human, so there is no such thing as ½ in the system of natural numbers. Now this
is not to say that a dog, cat, or human cannot be divided, just that what results will not
also (still) be a dog, cat, or human. On the other hand, discrete quantity is conceivable as
endlessly finite (though only insofar as it can always be conceived as greater), and so too
is the system of natural numbers. For example, for any discrete quantity of dogs, cats, or
humans that may be conceived, a greater discrete quantity thereof can always be
conceived, and so too for any given number a greater number can always be
conceived. 167

Lawrence Spencer, “1, Continuous Versus Discrete”, The Math Page – An Approach to Calculus, Accessed
March 19, 2021; Lawrence Spencer “4, Continuous Versus Discrete”, The Math Page – An Approach to Calculus,
Accessed March 19, 2021.
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(11) is obvious from the relevant passages, but what exactly is meant by measure
is in need of explication. Some things, conceived in abstraction from Substance, can only
be conceived as continuous, e.g., space. Now, in order that we might imagine these
continuous wholes as easily as possible, we created systems of measurement. We then
applied number to these systems of measurement in order to imagine and utilize these
systems as easily as possible. However, number as it is applied to discrete quantity and
number as it is applied to measure is not the same. For continuous quantity and so too
measure is endlessly divisible. For example, the distance between any two points in
space, say the distance between the Earth and Mars at a given time can be divided into
any number of parts, and those parts themselves can be divided into any number of parts,
and so on. So, in applying number to measure, number was expanded beyond the natural
numbers. Moreover, continuous quantity and so too measure are endlessly finite. For
example, for any distance, a greater distance can always be conceived; likewise, a lesser
distance can always be conceived. 168
(12) is obvious from the relevant passages, but what exactly is meant by time is in
need of explication. The actual duration of a mode can be given as the series and order of
cause from when the mode was brought into existence until it went out of existence. Or
what is the same, when referring to the actual duration of a mode, one would reference
the link in the chain of causes wherein the mode became actual and the link wherein it
ceased to persevere in its actuality, as one might point out on a sheet of music where the
first verse begins and ends. However, we cannot see this sheet of music or understand or

Lawrence Spencer, “1, Continuous Versus Discrete”, The Math Page – An Approach to Calculus, Accessed
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imagine it easily when we do, we make reference to something seen, understood, and
easily imagined, such as the rising and the setting of the sun (the rotation of the Earth).
So, in this way, we say that the duration of a mode was “three days” if while the mode
persisted in actuality, the Earth completed three rotations. This comparison is what is
commonly referred to as time. Now, in order that we can imagine duration as easily as
possible, we applied measure to it, conceiving duration as a continuous whole. We then
applied number to measure as already mentioned. Time, thus conceived, is endlessly
divisible and endlessly finite (both as greater and as lesser).
(13) is obvious from the relevant passages. According to Spinoza, people
mistakenly thinking that number, measure, and time were aspects of reality rather than
modes of thinking and that number, measure, and time are only endlessly finite,
mistakenly denied that the actually infinite exists in reality. 169 The most obvious example
of the actually infinite is extension. However, as this is sufficiently proved in the body, I
shall not treat of it anymore here. (14) and (15) are obvious from the relevant passages.

Note: The people Spinoza refers to are likely the Aristotelians and/or those that followed Aristotelian thought on
that matter.
169
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Chapter 3

A Spinozistic Answer to the Po∃ and the PoA

Now that we have sufficiently explicated Spinoza’s metaphysics, we can construct an
answer to the Po∃ and the PoA. I have chosen to do so in the style of Spinoza’s ethics, for the
simple reason that laying things out in this fashion tends to make it easier to understand.
Definitions:
1. Attribute of Existence – A general way of existing, e.g., as extended.
2. Conceptual Necessity – A thing is necessary of its essence if its existence is contained in
its essence, i.e., if it’s contradictory to suppose that it doesn’t exist.
3. Conceptual Non-Finitude – A thing is conceptually non-finite if its non-finitude is
contained within itself, i.e., if it is contradictory to suppose that it is finite. So, a thing
which is non-finite in virtue of its essence (conceptually non-finite) cannot be or be
conceived as finite, divisible, or manifold, without thereby annulling our conception of it.
4. Duration – Existence conceived in abstraction as a kind of quantity.
5. Eternal – That which does not admit of “before”, or “after”, i.e., that to which the
concepts of “before”, or “after” cannot be applied without thereby impairing or annulling
the conception of that to they are being applied.
6. Eternity – Conceptually non-finite existence.
7. Finite – A thing is finite if it can be or be conceived as greater or less without thereby
impairing or annulling our conception of it.
8. Mode – That which is in something else and is conceived through something else; that is,
that the conception of which requires the conception of another thing from which it has
been formed. 170
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9. Other-Caused Cause – That which is caused by something else; that which exists by
nomological and causal necessity. That which exists necessarily of another’s nature (i.e.,
whose essence involves only possible existence). That whose essence does not involve
existence; or that whose nature can be conceived as not existing.
10. Self-Caused Cause – That which is caused by itself; or that which exists by conceptual
necessity. That which exists necessarily of its own nature (i.e., whose essence involves
existence). That whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived
only as existing. 171
11. Substance – That which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the
conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to
be formed. 172
Axioms:
1. There is a self-caused cause.
2. All things that exist, exist either in themselves (i.e., are self-caused) or in something else
(i.e., are other-caused).
3. All things that are conceived, are conceived either through themselves (i.e., are
Substances) or through something else (i.e., are Modes).
4. The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.
5. Every aspect of a self-caused cause follows from the fact that it is self-caused.

Spinoza, MT, Part 1, Ch. 1, Of Real Being, Fictitious Being, and Being of Reason, [The division of Being.], 180;
Spinoza, E1D1, 217.
172
Spinoza, E1D3, 217.
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Proposition 1: A self-caused cause is necessarily a substance, and vice versa.
First Proof: Suppose a self-caused cause is not a Substance. It must then be the case that
it is a mode. But then the conception of a self-caused cause would require the conception of that
from which it has been formed. But then a self-caused cause would have been formed from
something else, i.e., then it would be other-caused. But that is contradictory. Therefore, a selfcaused cause is necessarily a Substance.
Second Proof: Suppose a Substance was not a self-caused cause. It must then be the case
that it is an other-caused cause. But then the conception of said Substance would require the
conception of that from which it was formed, which is contradictory. Therefore, a Substance is
necessarily a self-caused cause.
Proposition 2: A self-caused cause necessarily exists.
First Proof: This follows solely from the definition of a self-caused cause.
Second Proof: Existence is a necessary aspect of a self-caused cause. So, if a self-caused
cause exists, then it necessarily exists. A self-caused cause exists. Therefore, a self-caused cause
necessarily exists.
Proposition 3: The essence and existence of a self-caused cause are necessarily unified.
Proof: Suppose the essence and existence of a self-caused cause were distinct. It must
then be the case that one can be conceived without the other, i.e., it must then be the case that a
self-caused cause can be conceived as not existing. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, the
essence and existence of a self-caused cause are necessarily unified.
Proposition 4: A self-caused cause cannot cause another self-caused cause, nor can a substance
cause another substance.
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First Proof: Suppose a self-caused cause were to cause another self-caused cause. It must
then be the case that the second self-caused cause is both a self-caused cause and an other-caused
cause. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused cause cannot cause another self-caused
cause.
Second Proof: Suppose a Substance were to cause another Substance. It must then be the
case that the second Substance is both a Substance and a Mode. But that’s contradictory.
Therefore, a Substance cannot cause another Substance.
Proposition 5: The ultimate origin of everything that is other-caused is necessarily something
that is self-caused; or everything that is other-caused was necessarily ultimately caused by
something that is self-caused.
Proof: Suppose the ultimate origin of everything that is other-caused wasn’t something
that is self-caused, i.e., suppose there is something that is other-caused that wasn’t caused by
something that is self-caused. It must then be the case that the ultimate origin of something that
is other-caused is something else which itself is other-caused, i.e., it must then be the case that
there is something that was ultimately caused by an other-caused cause. But that’s contradictory.
Therefore, everything that is other-caused was ultimately caused by something that is selfcaused.
Proposition 6: A self-caused cause is necessarily unique (there is necessarily only one distinct
self-caused cause).
Proof: Suppose a self-caused cause were not unique (i.e., suppose there were multiple
distinct self-caused causes). It must then be the case that not every aspect of self-caused cause
follows from the fact that it is self-caused. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused
cause is necessarily unique (there is necessarily only one self-caused cause).
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Proposition 7: A self-caused cause is necessarily conceptually non-finite.
Proof: Suppose a self-caused cause was not conceptually non-finite. It must then be the
case that it can be or be conceived as finite. But a self-caused cause is conceptually necessary.
So, a self-caused cause cannot be or be conceived other than it is. That which cannot be or be
conceived as other than it is, cannot be or be conceived as finite. Thus, a self-caused cause
cannot be or be conceived as finite. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused cause is
conceptually non-finite.
Proposition 8: A self-caused cause is necessarily eternal.
Proof: Suppose a self-caused cause was not eternal. It must then be the case that the
concept of “before” or “after” apply to it. But then a self-caused cause could be conceived as not
existing. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused cause is necessarily eternal.
Proposition 9: A self-caused cause necessarily has eternity. [Tier 1, 2]
First Proof: Suppose the existence of a self-caused cause was not conceptually nonfinite. It must then be the case that a self-caused cause can be or be conceived as finite. But then
not every aspect of a self-caused cause would follow from the fact that it is self-caused. But
that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused cause necessarily has eternity.
Second Proof: Suppose the existence of a self-caused cause was not conceptually nonfinite. It must then be the case that a self-caused cause is not conceptually non-finite, for as the
essence and existence of a self-caused cause are necessarily unified, what applies to its existence
must also apply to its essence. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, a self-caused cause
necessarily has eternity.
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Proposition 10: Every effect of a self-caused cause is an other-caused cause.
Proof: Suppose an effect of a self-caused cause was not an other-caused cause. It must
then be the case that it’s a self-caused cause. But then a self-caused cause could cause another
self-caused cause, which is contradictory. Therefore, every effect of a self-caused cause is othercaused cause.
Proposition 11: There is necessarily only one self-caused cause of a given essence.
First Proof: Suppose there were two self-caused causes of a given essence. By
supposition, the essences of the two self-caused causes are identical, xn = yn and yn = xn. By
supposition, the self-caused causes are distinct, x ≠ y and y ≠ x. The essence and existence of a
self-caused cause is necessarily unified, so xn = x and yn = y. But then x = y and y = x. But that’s
contradictory. Therefore, there is necessarily only one self-caused cause of a given essence.
Proposition 12: Everything that exists is either a self-caused cause or an implication thereof and
cannot be or be conceived without said self-caused cause.
Proof: Everything that is other-caused was ultimately caused by something that is selfcaused. There is necessarily only one unique self-caused cause of a given essence. Therefore,
everything that exists is either a self-caused cause or an implication thereof and cannot be or be
conceived without said self-caused cause.
Proposition 13: Every attribute of existence belongs to a self-caused cause.
First Proof: Suppose not every attribute of existence belonged to a self-caused cause. It
must then be the case that the existence of a self-caused cause is finite. But that’s contradictory.
Therefore, every attribute of existence belongs to a self-caused cause.
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Second Proof: The existence of a self-caused cause is conceptually non-finite. So, all
that expresses existence belongs to a self-caused cause. From this it follows that no attribute of
existence can be denied of a self-caused cause, i.e., every attribute of existence belongs a selfcaused cause.
Proposition 14: Each attribute of existence is conceptually non-finite.
Proof: Suppose an attribute of existence were finite. It must then be the case that an
aspect of Substance is finite. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, each attribute of existence is
conceptually non-finite.
Proposition 15: Every mode of every attribute of a self-caused cause is necessarily always
actual.
Proof: Suppose a mode of some attribute of a self-caused cause is not actual. Suppose
also that the mode then becomes actual. It must then be the case that a self-caused cause is finite,
for some aspect of it will have thus increased. But that’s contradictory. Suppose a mode of some
attribute of a self-caused cause is actual, but stops being so. It must then be the case that a selfcaused cause is finite, for some aspect of it will have thus diminished. But that’s contradictory.
Therefore, every mode of every attribute of a self-caused cause is necessarily always actual.
Proposition 16: There exists conceptually non-finite things in conceptually non-finite ways.
Proof: Suppose there does not exist conceptually non-finite things in conceptually nonfinite ways. It must then be the case that the existence of a self-caused cause is finite. For if the
existence of a self-caused cause is conceptually non-finite, then all that expresses existence
belongs to it, and as such must also exist. Therefore, there exists conceptually non-finite things in
conceptually non-finite ways.
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Proposition 17: Extension is necessarily actually infinite.
First Proof: Suppose extension is not actually infinite. It must then be the case that
extension has a necessary end or limit. But extension cannot be conceived as having an end or
limit, nor is there anything whereby it might be so limited. Therefore, extension is necessarily
actually infinite.
Second Proof: Extension is conceptually non-finite, so cannot be or be conceived as
finite. Extension cannot be conceived as having an end or limit, nor is there anything whereby it
might be so limited. Therefore, extension is necessarily actually infinite.
Proposition 18: Every attribute of existence is necessarily actually infinite.
Proof: This follows by parity of reasoning from the previous proposition.
Proposition 19: Nothing can ever be other than it is.
Proof: Suppose something could be other than it is. It must then be the case that a selfcaused cause is not conceptually necessary, for everything exists is either a self-caused cause or
an implication thereof. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, nothing can ever be other than it is.
Proposition 20: Energy cannot be created or destroyed.
Proof: Suppose energy could be created. It must then be the case that a self-caused cause
is finite, for some aspect of it was thus increased. But that’s contradictory. Suppose energy could
be destroyed. It must then be the case that a self-caused cause is finite, for some aspect of it was
thus diminished. But that’s contradictory. Therefore, energy cannot be created or destroyed.
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Chapter 4

Conclusion, and some implications thereof.

There are many more propositions which could be proved, but the twenty above are
sufficient for our purposes. We have an answer to the Po∃, namely that there is something
because it is conceptually necessary that there be something. We also have an answer for the
PoA, namely that things exist as they do rather than some other way because things cannot be
any other way than they are. Neither A1 nor A2 was violated. So, it appears that a self-caused
cause answer to the Po∃ and the PoA based on Spinozistic metaphysics works!
Now that the Po∃ and the PoA have been solved, a would like to take a moment to
consider a few of the other problems a self-caused cause based on Spinozistic metaphysics could
be fruitfully applied to. The following five come to mind:
1. Problems in the philosophy of science regarding explanation
2. Problems in the philosophy of science regarding what laws of Nature are.
3. Hume’s problem of induction.
4. Problems in metaphysics regarding overdetermination.
5. Problems in mathematics regarding probability, especially what it is for something to be
probable.
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